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THE STRUCTURE OF PARTY SOLIDARITY
IN THE ONTARIO LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

by

JAMES EDWARD TWISS

B.A. Waterloo Lutheran University, 1972

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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Examining Committee

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ABSTRACT

Between reactionaries and radicals a wide gulf exists in terms of political opinions. Within much narrower realms of conflict are the political issues which separate the body politic into contending groups. Within this narrower ideological spectrum a survey of the Twenty-Ninth Parliament of the Ontario Legislative Assembly was undertaken. This survey sought data on the attitudes of legislators towards various beliefs, interest groups, symbols and values. These efforts were made in order to test the existence of ideological differences between the present political parties of Ontario.

The responses to the ideological questions were manipulated to construct attitudinal patterns. The results of the various statistical tests showed that three major ideological patterns exist in Ontario politics. These patterns can be characterized as Tory, Whig and Socialist. Each attitudinal pattern is integrally associated with one political party. The Progressive Conservatives are predominantly Tories while Liberals are Whigs and New Democrats are Socialists.

Efforts were made to explain the external features that influenced the particular attitudinal pattern a legislator adopted. The results of the study showed that

the attitudes of a legislator were affected dramatically by the type of constituency he represented. However, the most important conclusion of the study is that the present party structure in Ontario is ideologically relevant. While parties display varying degrees of ideological cohesion the levels of cohesion are high enough for significant differences to exist between the attitudinal patterns of the parties.

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CHAPTER I

THE CONCERNS OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

Introduction

Political science is a broad, multi-faceted discipline. One sub-discipline to evolve has been the study of legislative behavior. A cardinal assumption of this sub-discipline has been that the behavior of elected legislators can and ought to be explained. Few political scientists, if any, believe that the actions of participants in political struggles are totally random. To believe in the random theory of legislative behavior requires one to categorize politicians as "equivalent to the steel ball in a pinball game bumping passively from post to post down an inclined plane."¹ If every legislator behaved in a random fashion then the actions of any group of legislators would be unpredictable and any trends that did emerge would be purely coincidental. Clearly, legislators do not behave in such a haphazard fashion. At a minimum, elected representatives are organized into political parties and blocs which bring order to potentially chaotic situations.

¹Donald R. Matthews, Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 2.

Early efforts in the study of legislative behavior sought to describe particular phenomena, but offered little in the way of empirical verification and measurement. These initial studies set out to describe informally various pressures constraining the behavior of the elected legislator. A legislator was thought to be loyal to and to be affected by: (1) his constituency, (2) his party or leadership, and (3) his own ideals.¹ Stuart A. Rice modified the framework by adding the element of 'scientific precision.' The studies that Rice undertook on legislative behavior, and particularly the inquiries into the influences exerted on legislators, were designed to construct crude empirical observations. At the time of their development in the 1920's, the index of group 'cohesion' and the index of 'likeness' between groups were seen as the "most valuable as well as the most ingenious development of technique."² Another

¹Influences related to constituency and party may be thought of as external influences. The attitudes, biases, interests and predispositions of the individual legislator may be considered examples of internal influences. Such variables have been singled out, often quite arbitrarily, as particularly significant in explaining legislative actions. The relationship between the internal and external influences will be explored throughout this study.

²Herman Carey Beyle, Identification and Analysis of Attribute - Cluster - Blocs (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970), p. 3.

researcher of the period, H. C. Beyle, set out to alter the Rice methodology in the hope of obtaining a technique for the "identification of significantly cohering blocs of individuals within any given larger group and further identification and analysis of the clusters of discovered blocs."¹

In developing a methodology, both Rice and Beyle chose the voting behavior of individual legislators as the unit of analysis. Such a choice constituted a shift from formal, institutional analysis to a more informal variation of structural analysis.² By empirically grouping legislators into significantly cohering voting blocs, Beyle moved the discipline toward the description and explanation of behavior patterns. Both the general approach and the specific techniques introduced by Rice and Beyle were later adopted by succeeding generations of investigators. In studies since the 1930's, political scientists have attempted to explain legislative behavior in terms of such variables as party identification, constituency characteristics, legislative role perceptions, and the personal attributes of the legislator.

¹Beyle, op. cit., p. v.

²For a more complete outline on this shift in approach see the introduction to Beyle, op. cit., pp. v - x.

The main focus of this thesis is the analysis of party solidarity in the Ontario legislature. The study compares cohesion among parties and among issue-areas. The study looks at the impact exerted on cohesion by leadership, by party loyalty, by constituencies, and by personal ideals. Finally, the thesis explores alternative re-alignments that might provide the legislature with a more "natural" division of its membership.

This thesis is based on statistical techniques different from those employed in the vast majority of other studies. The next section of this chapter offers a critical evaluation of the more traditional techniques. The final section of this chapter presents an overview of the field of legislative behavior in order to permit a basis of comparison for the empirical findings revealed in subsequent chapters.

The Techniques of Rice and Beyle

John Grumm has identified five criteria by which to evaluate techniques used in the analysis of blocs.¹ These criteria are valid whether the objects of analysis are political parties, ideological blocs or any other

¹John C. Grumm, "The Systematic Analysis of Blocs in the Study of Legislative Behavior." Western Political Quarterly, XVII (1965), pp. 350 - 362.

sub-groups in a legislative body. There must be:

(1)an objective means of defining the blocs in terms of their size, composition and purpose; (2)a process for discovering the structure of inter-relationships within the blocs; (3)a ~~basis~~ basis for determining the cohesiveness of the bloc and its relationship to other blocs; (4)a means of determining the sorts of issues that engender a group response, and; (5)a basis for analyzing the motivational factors involved in a bloc. It will be against this set of requirements that the techniques developed by Rice and Beyle will be evaluated.

Rice proposed a technique for the evaluation of blocs know as the index of cohesion. Constructed from dichotomous data, the cohesion index has been applied mainly to roll-call votes in legislatures.¹ The method begins by selecting the members who are considered to form a bloc. As Rice admits,

the existence of a group made up of certain pre-determined individual members must be postulated before the tests of cohesion and likeness can be applied. The methods cited will not serve to determine automatically the effective groupings that actually exist within the body.²

¹It is important to note that the index of cohesion could be applied to data other than roll-call data provided that this datamet the requirement of being dichotomous.

²Stuart A. Rice, "The Identification of Blocs in Small Bodies," American Political Science Review, XXI (1927), p. 619.

This limitation has grave consequences. There can be no assurance that the blocs which are postulated are in fact the best possible combination. As Rice conceded his technique might "fail to discover the most cohesive groupings because of the lack of an objective empirical method for ascertaining the latter."¹ The inclusion in a bloc of even one member who should not have been considered can significantly alter the outcome of the test.²

The index of cohesion is essentially a simple arithmetical calculation. If all members of a party or a bloc vote in the same manner, the index is 100. If three quarters vote one way the cohesion level is 50. If there is an even split, the index is 0. The index of cohesion is found by subtracting the percentage of the group in the minority from the percentage that constitutes the majority.³ This calculation is made for each roll-call vote and then an overall mean is computed.⁴

¹Rice, op. cit., p. 620.

²This possibility is openly admitted by Rice but he offers no solution for overcoming the difficulty.

³See Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: Knopf, 1928), Chapter 16.

⁴Several authors have commented on the drawbacks present in this procedure. Duane Lockard believes that the index conceals the issue behind the roll-call. Some roll-call votes will be on matters of no consequence to the party while others might be considered crucial. A

When the Rice index of cohesion is used as a measure of group influence, without any form of statistical control of non-group factors, any vote split which is not an even fifty - fifty split is considered to be a function of the group's influence on the legislative behavior.¹ A further failing, or at least a potential failing, lies in the assumption of what the group position is. Rice defines the group position as the position taken by the majority. However it is possible that the group position might actually be supported by half the group or less.²

standard application of the index will not distinguish between importance of issues. See Duane Lockard, "Legislative Politics in Connecticut," American Political Science Review, XLVII (1954), 166 - 173. Criticism of this type prompted Duncan MacRae to conclude that bloc analysis is best suited to a "situation in which groups of legislators form genuine coalitions voting on measures as a matter of consultation or strategy rather than in terms of underlying attitudes." See Duncan MacRae, The Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-First Congress (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 303. By averaging scores on various roll-calls without reference to their content the index finds legislators who vote alike, but do not necessarily hold the same attitudes. If there really are several different underlying dimensions of choice, each of which determines the vote in a particular subset of roll-calls, bloc analysis will obscure this.

¹Aage R. Clausen, "The Measurement of Legislative Group Behavior," Midwest Journal of Politics, XI (1967), p. 214.

²Ibid. For example the leadership of the group might adopt a policy at odds with majority feeling in the party, bloc or whatever unit is under analysis. In addition a definitive policy statement or a government decision might be taken as evidence of the "true" group position.

Once the index of cohesion has been determined, the second of Rice's twin techniques is calculated. The proposed "index of likeness" is computed "as the complement of the difference in the proportion of two groups voting in a given direction."¹ An index is computed for each roll-call and then averaged. The index of likeness has many of the weaknesses exhibited by the index of cohesion. It is important to note here that the index of likeness can only score two groups at a time. When more than two groups are tested, the resulting index of likeness scores are not comparable.²

In addition to providing these measures for the evaluation of group cohesiveness, Rice outlined a procedure to compute blocs. This method begins by calculating the percentage of times that each legislator votes in agreement with each of the other legislators. The agreement percentages for all possible pairs of legislators are then listed in a table in order of their magnitude. Once the table has been completed a cut-off

¹Clausen, op. cit., p. 221. If the same proportion of each group votes in an identical manner the difference in proportion is 0. The score for the index of likeness is the proportional complement, 100.

²For example if Bloc A has an index of likeness score of 80 with Bloc B and Bloc C, no statement could be made about the relationship between Blocs B and C because both Blocs may not hold the same issues in common with A.

point has to be set to signify which agreements are significant enough to constitute a bloc. Rice arbitrarily set this cut-off point at eighty per cent of agreement. The minimum size of each bloc must also be predetermined. On intuitive grounds, Rice set the minimum membership size at four.¹ Those pairs that do not show agreement scores of eighty per cent or greater are excluded from consideration. Individuals who not have agreement scores of eighty per cent with at least three other legislators are also dropped from consideration.² The legislators left in consideration are divided into blocs on the basis of the issues selected.

¹Beyle goes to great lengths to point out the drawback of such a procedure. For example, in a study of the Minnesota legislature in the 1930's the problem of detecting blocs of members would involve identifying the significant blocs among 147,573,952,534,561,764,882 possible combinations composed of from three to sixty-four members each. Basically Beyle saw the difficulty with the Rice methodology as an outgrowth of the enormous number of possible combinations among the members of even a small legislative body. The number of combinations increases geometrically with increases in the absolute size of the legislative body. See Beyle, op. cit., p. 5.

²This latter step may have to be iterated several times because, as individuals are eliminated, other individuals with whom they have been paired might fall below the criterion that they must have eighty percent agreement scores with at least three individuals. The process of elimination may mean that a substantial proportion of the legislators will remain unclassified. As a result, the makeup of the blocs that do emerge can be highly misleading or artificial. A conscious effort could be made to include more legislators in the blocs by either reducing the minimum size of blocs or by lowering the agreement level to a percentage less than eighty. Both of these changes would be highly arbitrary and difficult to justify.

Unfortunately, any application of the method is exceedingly laborious. As Rice acknowledged,

Application of the technique is not practicable in bodies exceeding 25 or 30 in membership because of the inordinate amount of labour which the tabulation and computation would involve.¹

An additional problem with the technique concerns the inflationary effects on index scores caused by the presence of unanimous or near-unanimous voting splits in the data.²

Beyle developed an alternative technique based on more objective criteria. Instead of a simple percentage of agreement, Beyle formulated "an index of significant cohesion of pairs." Beyle assumed that the probability of two legislators agreeing on either side of an issue was fifty percent. However, the probability of agreeing on a given side of the issue was only half that amount. Therefore zero cohesion was defined as twenty-five percent agreement or less. Beyle then proceeded to transform the percentages between twenty-five and one hundred into a range from zero to one hundred.

¹Rice, "The Identification of Blocs in Small Political Bodies," p. 627.

²The effects of near-unanimous agreements on the Rice indices and method of bloc calculation are outlined by Hugh L. Leblance, "Voting in a State Senate: Party and Constituency Influences," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (1969), p. 35.

Beyle's other modification was to place the indices in a matrix so that one could readily ascertain the most cohesive pair. This cohesive pair would serve as the nucleus of the bloc. Members with high scores of agreement with the original pair would be added. This expansion procedure continues until it is possible to identify an "inner-core," "inner fringe," and "outer fringe."¹ Once the first bloc has been identified, then the most cohesive of the remaining pairs is isolated to form the nucleus of the second bloc. This process could continue indefinitely. The expansion procedure could result in some degree of overlapping, by which a legislator is included in more than one group. In addition, a number of legislators might fail to be classified in any bloc.²

Since the Beyle method of bloc construction is basically a modification of the Rice technique, it shares many of the shortcomings already enumerated in the evaluation of the Rice methodology. Neither technique

¹Unlike Rice, Beyle did not use a predetermined cut-off point for levels of cohesion. Instead Beyle searched for natural breaks in the data. As a result, the minimum level of cohesion required to be a member of a bloc was variable depending upon the circumstances of the study.

²For a rare application of Beyle's technique, see David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study. Truman used raw agreement scores. Hence it appears that the Beyle method can be used satisfactorily without all the complex statistical paraphernalia associated with the index of significant cohesion of pairs.

provides a solution that involves no subjective judgement.¹ The arbitrariness of Rice's cut-off points is more obvious than the subjective decisions required with the Beyle technique. Nevertheless, by setting down relatively few guidelines Beyle left his technique open to gross misuse.² Both techniques fail to reveal the structure of relationships within the blocs. The two procedures may conceivably allocate a nuclear position to legislators who are actually on the fringe of the bloc. By allowing certain legislators to be excluded from blocs the techniques tend to distort the actual relationships that are present.

Rice and Beyle offer statistical measures to gauge the cohesion of the groups. The reliability of these statistics is questionable because of the inflationary

¹Grumm reviews the Beyle method and concludes that despite its statistical precision the method did not provide an explicit procedure for assigning members to a bloc or for drawing the limits of the bloc. One cannot tell whether to give priority in constructing a cluster to the individual who has a very high agreement score with only a few members of the cluster nucleus or to the person having somewhat lower scores with a larger number of cluster members. Thus it would be possible under the Beyle method to identify as the nucleus of a bloc legislators who in fact exceeded the norms of the group. See Grumm, op. cit., p. 352.

²With no cut-off guidelines Beyle opens up the possibility that researchers will use those guidelines that best suit their own purposes. However, this does not mean that the criteria for cut-off points be as rigid as those proposed by Rice.

effects of near-unanimous votes, because of distortion caused by averaging a number of indices, and because of the method used in the selection of issues. Bloc analysis techniques ought to isolate those issues "most likely to engender a bloc response."¹ Neither the Rice nor the Beyle techniques allows for the easy identification of such issues since both techniques attribute equal weight to each issue. In other words, important issues are treated the same as trivial matters.

The clustering process should allow for inferences to be made regarding the motivational factors involved in bloc behavior.² The procedures outlined by Rice and Beyle produce blocs upon which further motivational studies can be carried out. However, if the groups produced by this method are misleading or distorted then the inferences about motivational factors will also be misleading or distorted.

The Studies of Blocs and Parties

The last twenty years have witnessed a number of significant studies analyzing the solidarity of parties

¹Grumm, op. cit., p. 362.

²Little has been said thus far regarding this criterion for it assumes that the blocs arrived at under the previous four criteria are valid blocs.

and blocs. Almost all of these studies originated in the United States with the result that the data is usually drawn from roll-call votes in either the Congress or state legislatures.¹ Many of these studies utilized the indices formulated by Rice.

The studies to be cited in this section make one underlying assumption about the relationship between votes cast on bills and the ideological beliefs of the legislator.² David B. Truman observes,

Roll-call votes ... have the great advantage of being 'hard' data. Like statistics on elections, they represent discrete acts the fact of whose occurrence is not subject to dispute.³

As a result, the roll-call is often taken to be a concrete expression of a legislator's ideological beliefs. Issues to which ideological significance is attached will find

¹No Canadian study could be found that dealt specifically, in an empirical fashion, with the issue of cohesion among both parties and blocs. Leon Epstein dealt with the cohesion of parties in the Canadian House of Commons by basing his study on the recorded votes of that legislative body. See Leon Epstein, "A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties," American Political Science Review, LVIII (1964), pp. 46 - 60. The Epstein study did not attempt to consider ideological cohesion or the presence of blocs.

²Once again it is necessary to reiterate the failings present in the use of roll-call votes to construct the indices formulated by Rice. Issues vary in importance. A difficulty arises when attempting to weight the issues to correspond to their relative importance due to the extremely subjective nature of the task.

³Julius Turner, Party and Constitutency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), p. 12.

the blocs aligned against each other. It is possible that roll-call votes can reflect more than ideological beliefs. The interests of parties, regional factions, and demographic blocs can be established by analyzing the voting patterns of a legislature's membership. Issues to which partisan, factional or demographic significance are attached will find the various groups arrayed in positions opposed to each other. As a result roll-call votes can be used to test the existence of a number of diverse cleavages within a legislative body.¹

Once the data has been obtained from the roll-call votes, the researcher must still determine whether he will analyze the problem from the viewpoint of the individual legislator or the group. If attention is focused on the individual, the legislator's votes become the object of analysis. On the other hand, if the study is approached from the perspective of the group the vote division of the group becomes the object of analysis.

¹Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel G. Patterson set forth the idea that the level of cohesion varies with the type of issue. If this belief is true then a researcher using certain actual and specific issues can distort the results of an allocation of legislators to hypothetical blocs. Thus it may not be possible to extrapolate the results of roll-call votes into representing the ideological beliefs of a legislator. Jewell and Patterson cite an example of how various types of issues effect party cohesion. See Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel G. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 430.

At the individual legislator level a measure of individual behavior involves a comparison of one person's vote with another in order to determine the consistency with which individual differences and similarities appear. In measures of group behavior, the focus is on the conformity of the group members' votes to an operationally defined group position.¹

The individual-group distinction may not be as clear as this quotation would have it appear, but nevertheless the distinction prevades all the studies and thus each study can be categorized as either belonging to the group or individual approach. The hypotheses tested by each category of study reflect the differences in approach.

At the individual level of analysis, efforts have been concentrated on explaining variations in legislators' attitudes and behavior through differences in social and political characteristics of legislators and demographic features of their constituencies.² Frequently this has been achieved by cross-tabulating the demographic characteristics of legislators and their districts with the legislators attitudes and behavior.

Much of the literature explores the effects exerted by constituency variables on the attitudes of legislators. Kornberg, for example, argues that there is a direct connection between socio-economic interests in constituencies and legislative attitudes. Legislators

¹Clausen, op. cit., p. 212.

do not wish to risk electoral defeat by alienating these interests.¹ It is possible to make an assumption that similar constituency interests comprise comparable socio-economic environments. As a result legislators who are exposed to the same constituency interests would tend to hold similar attitudes.² By this line of reasoning, ideological blocs are a reflection of the demographic cleavages that exist between constituencies.³

A diversity of interests would indicate a heterogeneous constituency. With no dominant interest upon which to construct an electoral strategy it would be increasingly difficult to maintain a successful coalition. Thus one hypothesis that has been advanced is that a competitive electoral district tends to be heterogeneous in terms of demographic characteristics.⁴

¹Allan Kornberg, "Perception and Constituency Influence on Legislative Behavior." Western Political Quarterly, XIX (1966), p. 226.

²Louis A. Froman, Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 11.

³The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that political parties aim their electoral appeal at particular interests present in the electorate and that the parties will then reflect these interests in the ideology that they adopt. In short it would mean that political parties would become synonymous with ideological blocs.

⁴Froman, op. cit., p. 11.

The more competitive the constituency, the greater the likelihood of the legislator deviating from the established ideological position of the party.¹ In a similar vein, it has been hypothesized that deviation from the party's ideological norms is greatest among members whose districts are atypical of the party and most like that of the opposition party.² Heinz Eulau presents the view that legislators from competitive ridings, which also tend to be atypical constituencies, are more dependent on their party's support than legislators coming from one-party areas. To Eulau, partisanship would seem to be more salient in competitive electoral districts than in others.³

¹Froman, op. cit., pp. 113 - 114. Froman reasoned that competitive constituencies, because of their greater heterogeneity, would more likely produce situations where the interests of the party conflicted with the riding's interests. With a close margin of victory a legislator would be more likely to heed the constituency than a member for a safe seat. See also Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," American Political Science Review, LVIII (1964), pp. 60 - 71. Flinn concluded that electoral margin had little to do with loyalty to party, except that the least secure members of the legislature, i.e. the members of the winning party with the lowest pluralities, were less loyal to the party than other members.

²Duncan MacRae, "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, XLVI (1952), p. 200.

³John C. Wahlke, and Heinz Eulau, eds., Legislative Behavior (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 344.

The studies that have approached legislative behavior by way of an analysis of the individual have tended to rely heavily on social background or behavior, rather than upon intervening attitudes. Such studies tend to be descriptive and give little more than body counts on the selected variables. Examples of this type of study include Julander's examination of the Utah State legislature,¹ Ross' study of parliamentary representation,² Pisciotte and Hjelm's analysis of Colorado legislators,³ and Prewitt and Nowlan's efforts to explain the behavior of incumbent politicians.⁴ Two recent studies of Canadian provincial legislatures fall into the same category. However, the analysis of Saskatchewan M.L.A.'s by David Smith⁵ and the study of recruitment patterns to the Ontario Legislative Assembly by

¹Rodney Julander, "The Composition and Voting Record of the Utah State Legislature, 1957 - 1963," Western Political Quarterly, XVII (1964), 88 - 90 (Supple.).

²J. F. S. Ross, Parliamentary Representation 2nd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949).

³Joseph P. Pisciotte, and Victor Hjelm, "Profile and Careers of Colorado State Legislators," Western Political Quarterly, XXI (1968), 698 - 722.

⁴Kenneth Prewitt, and William Nowlan, "Political Ambitions and Behavior of Incumbent Politicians," Western Political Quarterly, XXII (1969), 298 - 308.

⁵David E. Smith, "The Recruitment, Role Perceptions and Political Attitudes of Saskatchewan M.L.A.'s," Canadian Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, 1970.

Robert Williams¹ fail to utilize fully the statistical techniques at their disposal. At best only bivariate operations were employed, the most common of which was cross-tabulation.

Studies employing the individual member approach are particularly susceptible to becoming 'body count' endeavours. Simple empiricism is no substitute for conceptual clarification. To be meaningful, empirical studies must present research findings in a theoretically, or at least conceptually, viable framework. This framework must give more than ad hoc significance to the great variety of factors that make up the legislative process.² The adoption of the individual approach does not entirely preclude potentially significant findings. Rather, it may be that studies applying the group approach have looked at phenomena which lend themselves to more theoretical statements.³

¹Robert J. Williams, "Recruitment to the Ontario Legislature," Canadian Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, 1971.

²Wahlke and Eulau, op. cit., p. 355.

³One must be careful not to confuse more sophisticated techniques as evidence of a theoretically sound framework. "Brute empiricism no matter how elegant or rigorous in design, if it is unenlightened by theory it adds little to our understanding of legislative behavior and the legislative process." Wahlke and Eulau, op. cit., p. 355.

The one feature of the group approach to legislative behavior that makes such studies worthwhile is that the studies assume the existence of conflicting pressures on party or bloc members. Legislators are faced with conflicting pressures and must try to balance these pressures. Thus instead of being tied to the will of the constituency or party the legislator may in fact be "more free than others to exercise independent judgement."¹ If any decision made by the legislator is likely to bring both praise and condemnation then he may be able to base his decisions more on his own beliefs than the dictates of party or constituency.² If bifurcations are discovered in the behavior and attitudes of legislators from constituencies with different characteristics these bifurcations may indicate the presence of constituency pressures.³

In an analysis of constituency pressures, Julius Turner concluded that members from similar districts, and thus by inference subject to the same pressures,

¹Turner, op. cit., p. 165.

²In describing the conflicting pressures of party and constituency that a legislator faces it must be remembered that in relation to many of the issues the constituencies have no clear interests. Constituency interests are most likely to appear on broad social and economic issues.

³Turner, op. cit., p. 21.

tend to behave in the same way regardless of party ties.¹

The opposite point of view is taken by Thomas Flinn.

Flinn maintains that the situation is clear that,

members from similar constituencies do not vote in the same way and that differences between parties are not due to differences in the composition of the legislative parties in terms of constituencies represented.²

Conflicting findings, similar to the Flinn - Truman disagreement, are not uncommon in this particular branch of legislative behavior. For every study which posits a given relationship it is possible to cite another study to disclaim that hypothesis.

Discrepancies of this kind can be accounted for in several ways. First of all, most of the studies used roll-call votes as their source of data and various aspects of the Rice and Beyle techniques to manipulate the data. As a result the possibility exists that distortions would manifest themselves in individual studies. Secondly, almost all of the studies analyzed only one legislative body, be it a state legislature or Congress, and usually for a time period of only one

¹See Wayne W. Shannon, Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), p. 19. "Democrats with constituencies similar in terms of urban - rural makeup to those of regular Republicans at any time were more likely to vote like the latter than their colleagues and vice versa."

²Flinn, op. cit., p. 63.

or two sessions. Such cases provide no scientific basis for generalizing about the universe of legislative bodies from which the case is drawn.¹ The validity of the various hypotheses is not going to be established or disconfirmed by a single study. The best one can hope for is that with further refinements of technique, general trends concerning the variables will emerge with the passage of time and the application of the hypotheses to a number of jurisdictions and legislative bodies. The fact that to date there has been little demonstrated agreement on the relationship between legislator, party and constituency should not be construed as evidence that patterns of relationship are non-existent. Therefore the hypotheses concerning these relationships will continue to be outlined in the light of this note of caution.

One important aspect of constituency influence relates to the urban - rural split. From his analysis of Kansas legislators, Grumm concludes that in rural dominated parties it is not surprising that legislators from a more urban setting "only loosely attach themselves

¹Turner, op. cit., p. 11. The ability to make comparisons between legislators and parties reduced this limitation but does not eliminate it. The study of one legislature may not permit the drawing of general conclusions but does allow for the forming of possible trends.

to the bulk of the party."¹ By contrast Turner argues that the mere fact a legislator represents a large city may not be enough to cause him to vote with other members from large cities. Most large cities have certain characteristics in common, such as high concentrations of foreign-born inhabitants, Roman Catholics and industrial workers. To some extent urban - rural differences may be masking conflicts based on nationality, religion and economic status.²

In cases where the interests of party and constituency are not identical, the legislator has pressure exerted on him to deviate from the party position.³ Therefore when the constituencies are homogeneous for a party there is:

maximum of opportunity for agreement on issues within each party and a minimum of likelihood that legislators will be torn between loyalty to the legislative party and loyalty to the constituency.⁴

¹Grumm, op. cit., p. 361.

²Turner, op. cit., p. 73. The demographic difference are reflected in the problems which arise in urban and rural communities and in the means by which these problems are handled.

³MacRae, op. cit., p. 1046. The electoral margin in the last election may sensitize a legislator to behave differently from representatives of similar constituencies.

⁴Jewell and Patterson, op. cit., p. 423.

In a similar way, Truman believes that intra-party differences in attitudes can be explained by intra-party differences in the nature of constituencies.

Among possible differences in the demographic character of constituencies, the urban-rural cleavage has received considerable attention. Shannon and Jewell and Patterson argue that the urban-rural dichotomy is a crucial predictor of legislative attitudes and behavior.¹ Flinn also believes that different levels of urbanization among constituencies help to explain legislators' attitudes, but he attaches somewhat less importance to the variable than the preceding observers.²

Another structural influence on the attitudes of legislators may arise from the relative size of their parties. As parties become larger, there is an increase in the number of interests represented by the members, an increase in the number of potential conflicts, and an increase in internal dissension. In one form or another, this basic hypothesis is accepted by most researchers.³

¹Shannon, op. cit., p. 115, Jewell and Patterson, op. cit., p. 423.

²Flinn, op. cit., p. 63.

³One of the researchers that does disagree is Hugh LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates: Party and Constituency Influences," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (1969), p. 37. LeBlanc's position is supported by Sorauf, op. cit., p. 137 and Jewell and Patterson, op. cit., p. 422.

In the extreme case of one-party dominated legislatures, it is possible that the party ceases to be a unit of behavioral analysis. The party may become such a conglomeration of conflicting views and interests that the party exists only in name. Conversely a dominant party may not feel threatened by the opposition and thus may tolerate substantial deviation. The opposition parties may be driven either to a unified resistance¹ or they may see little point in trying to maintain a high degree of cohesion.² Generally, the majority party tends to be less cohesive than the minority parties.³

When there is less than total agreement within a party on ideological issues, attention can be focused on alternate groupings of members. These groupings need not be formal structures like parties. Instead it is possible, under these circumstances, to cluster members into blocs on the basis of their attitudinal patterns. A legislator is not required to use the bloc as a reference point. In fact the legislator may not be aware

¹Sorauf, op. cit., p. 137.

²Jewell and Patterson, op. cit., p. 422.

³MacRae, "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," p. 1049.

that he holds views in common with other members of the legislature. Since ideological blocs may be considered potential parties,¹ these groupings represent a possibility for more effective parties in the legislative system. Attention can be can be focused on the cohesion exhibited by political parties and on the best ideological alternatives to the present party structures.²

¹Rice, Farmers and Workers, p. 24.

²It may be noted that the review of the present relevant literature on legislative behavior contains few references to studies of parliamentary institutions. Studies of parliamentary systems have tended to define cohesion in terms of party discipline rather than ideology. In addition most studies of parliamentary bodies and parties are not of an empirical nature. As a result this study has placed heavy reliance on American research.

CHAPTER II

THE DATA BASE

Unique Feature of the Ontario Structure

The legislature of the Province of Ontario is a responsible legislative body. This means that the executive is answerable to, and part of, the legislative body. According to parliamentary tradition, the government is formed by the leader of the party possessing the support of the legislature. Since the survival of the executive depends upon the continued backing of the legislature, party discipline is strictly enforced by both the government and opposition parties. However, so long as basic party interests are not threatened an occasional deviation from the party line may be tolerated. Generally, the attitudes of individual members are expected to yield when in conflict with the views of their party. As a result, most of the recorded votes on legislation brought before the legislature show the parties to be voting as units.

Although Canadian roll-call data can be used as evidence that Canadian parties are disciplined, the data do not necessarily show that they are highly cohesive. In the United States the separation of the legislative and executive branches removes a major incentive for

party discipline. The recorded votes of legislators in the United States may reflect the ideological or constituency orientations of each legislator. It is therefore at least partially valid for American studies to test the cohesion of parties using roll-call votes as their source of data. Any application of such a procedure to a Canadian legislature would test the extent of party discipline rather than party cohesion.¹

If the effects of constituency variables and attitude orientations are to be measured in Canada, then a substitute for recorded votes must be found. The only feasible alternative is to conduct a survey of legislators to determine their attitudes, their personal characteristics, and the demographic features of their constituencies. It is through this procedure that a truly meaningful definition of party cohesion can be tested.

¹Leon Epstein believes that the cohesiveness of Canadian parties on both provincial and federal levels is undisputed despite the fact that there have been "no definitive roll-call studies to establish the degree of parliamentary cohesion..." See Leon Epstein, "A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties," American Political Science Review, LVII (1964), p. 52. To apply the roll-call procedure and such a definition of **cohesion** to the Canadian political setting only makes a mockery of the American assumption that beliefs and constituency variables affect legislative voting behavior.

The Data

The data used in this study were obtained through a questionnaire distributed to all members of the Legislative Assembly.¹ Part of the survey was designed to measure the attitudes held by legislators. Some measurement of attitudes was necessary if the ideological orientation of members was to be determined. The dilemma was whether to choose a large number of attitude areas with a few questions in each field or to choose a few restricted areas of interest and apply a series of questions. In selecting the first option, the researcher must weigh the advantage of being able to examine a relatively large number of attitudes without overburdening the respondent with the disadvantage of reduced reliability.² The second alternative offers the advantage of highly reliable results for each attitude field selected, but in order to keep the number of questions within reasonable bound only a small number of attitudes could be investigated.

¹The data were collected under the auspices of the Ontario Legislative Project, Waterloo Lutheran University. For helping to make the data available, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Conrad Winn, Director of the Project, and Dr. John Redekop, Chairman of the Political Science Department.

²There must be enough question of a sufficiently general nature that a researcher covering the same areas of interest, but not employing the same questions, would obtain compatible results. For a brief explanation of the concept of reliability see Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw - Hill, 1972), p. 12.

It is doubtful that the additional reliability brought about by the use of the second alternative would compensate for having only a limited number of attitudes. In the construction of attitudinal patterns additional weight is intuitively given to the presence of a large number of attitudes.¹ Consequently the survey was constructed to conform to the first alternative. In this way, the survey included a relatively large number of attitude areas with a few key question to represent each field.

Attitudes are dispositions to act. Therefore, attitudes can not be directly observed. As hypothetical constructs, attitudes must be linked with antecedent conditions and consequent behavior if they are to be fully understood. The holding of a certain set of attitudes is necessary but not sufficient to bring about a particular type of action.² An analysis of attitudinal patterns can not be expected to yield a perfect method for predicting the behavior of legislators. The addition of questions relating to the personal characteristics of the legislators and the demographic and electoral features of the constituencies enhances

¹This problem of survey construction is looked at by Hans J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954, pp. 143 - 144.

²Ibid., p. 265.

the validity of the results obtained through analysis of attitudes.

Questions on attitudes constitute the dependent variables in the inquiry. Efforts have been made to have these questions conform to the standards of content that are acceptable throughout the discipline. For many of the same reasons, the independent variables used to explain the dependent variables are the indicators that have become established in the discipline through continuous application. However, there must not be so many indicators that the complexity of the schema impairs its interpretation or applicability or so few that a substantial portion of the dependent variable's variance is left unexplained.¹ As a result only one indicator has been chosen to represent each demographic characteristic. For example, instead of asking for a breakdown of the major religions present in a riding, respondents were asked to provide only the percentage of constituents who were Roman Catholic. If necessary, the percentage of Protestants could be inferred from the information supplied. Usually the portion of Protestants is the complement of the portion of Roman Catholics. Thus the presence of two questions would only prove redundant.

¹This problem is tackled by Robert Drummond, "Multivariate Analysis of Party Choice in Ontario," Canadian Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, 1970.

In questions aimed at eliciting the attitudes of legislators there can be no objective measure. This is particularly significant in a study aiming to explain the political orientations of legislators. Questions are constructed to measure a member's attitude in a given field, and these questions must be of a nature that is acceptable to other investigators. For this reason, questions on specific legislative proposals have been kept to a minimum and an effort has been made to include questions which have a general applicability. General questions have the advantage of providing data relating to the attitudes of legislators with a minimum of chance that the response has been affected by the policy stance of the legislator's party. In other words general questions limit the influence of external factors and allow the legislator's beliefs to be more fully expressed.

The last major consideration taken into account deals with the form in which the values of the variables are expressed. The variables which are employed in the survey must provide results in a form which is amenable to the statistical techniques that will be used in testing the data. Without elaborating on the actual statistical procedures, let it suffice to state that a variety of multi-variate techniques will be applied. Multi-variate techniques require variables consisting of interally

scaled data. As a result, most variables were constructed to yield interval, or at least ordinal data.

Traditional indicators such as education and class were operationalized in a form that allowed them to meet the interval data requirement. Education was expressed in the form of the number of years of formal schooling. Class rather than being measured by a nominal scale was expressed in terms of a Blishen scale score.¹ Similarly, other variables were put in a form that was acceptable to the statistical techniques. All the question on attitudes were expressed in a form that allowed the respondent to select the appropriate position on a seven point Lickert scale. Some questions were put in the form of statements about which the respondent was asked to give his opinion.² The remaining questions on attitudes consisted of a list of people, organizations and countries. For each item in the list the legislator was asked to express his feelings by choosing a position on a seven point scale.³ It should be noted that the respondent had the option of not expressing an opinion

¹See Bernard Blishen et. al., Canadian Society: Sociological Perspectives (3rd ed.; Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 745 - 750.

²The options open to the respondent ranged from: Completely Agree -- Strongly Agree -- Agree -- Undecided -- Disagree -- Strongly Disagree -- Completely Disagree.

³The respondent was asked to chose from among the following alternatives: Completely Positive Feelings -- Strongly Positive Feelings -- Positive Feelings -- Neutral -- Negative Feelings -- Strongly Negative Feelings -- Completely Negative Feelings.

on any given question. Thus all attitudinal questions have responses which could be considered a response on an interval scale.

Distribution and Response

The questionnaires were distributed and returned in a two month period lasting from the third week of April to the third week of June, 1973. Each questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter from Dr. Conrad Winn on behalf of the Ontario Legislative Project. The unsigned questionnaires were to be returned in the mails. Respondents were also invited to mail, separate from the survey, a stamped card addressed to Dr. Winn requesting a statement of the project goals and/or copies of scholarly work based on their responses. By this "inducement" technique, respondents could be distinguished from non-respondents and follow-up was facilitated.

In the present legislature the two opposition parties, the Liberals and the New Democrats, have only limited representation. At the time the survey was conducted, the Liberal caucus consisted of twenty-two members and the New Democratic Party contingent was made up of nineteen legislators. Groups of this size provide a relatively small population. If a low response rate is encountered from these parties it will increase the difficulty of making accurate and reliable statements

as to the attitudinal patterns of the parties. Consequently, a particular effort was made to obtain responses from Liberal and New Democratic members. The questionnaires were distributed to these caucuses by members of the respective parties.¹ After the survey had been dispersed for one month those Liberals and New Democrats who had not responded were personally contacted and urged to complete the questionnaire. It was through these measures that a relatively high response rate was secured for the two opposition parties.

The Progressive Conservative Party, due to its substantial majority in the Legislature, represented a group from which a lower response rate would produce a sample size acceptable for statistical purposes. This fact allowed attention to be concentrated on eliciting responses from opposition MLA's and from certain sections of the Progressive Conservative caucus, namely MLA's holding executive positions.² Questionnaires were mailed to all members of the Progressive Conservative caucus.

¹Mr. James Breithaupt MLA circulated the survey among members of the Liberal Party while Mr. Stephen Lewis, leader of the New Democratic Party, performed the same function in his caucus. I gratefully acknowledge their help.

²Executive positions were defined as being cabinet posts and parliamentary assistantships.

After a period of one month, Progressive Conservative members who had not responded were either personally contacted or were mailed an additional questionnaire.¹

Overall there was a usable response rate of 55% to the questionnaire. Between the parties the rate ranged from a high of 84% with the New Democratic Party to a low of 46% for the Progressive Conservative Party.² The variations in the number of respondents from each party is important once a valid sample of each party has been obtained. The disproportionate number of New Democratic Party members included in the overall sample will not bias the results of the multivariate statistical techniques.

Using the data supplied by respondents of the three parties, a number of hypotheses related to the attitudinal patterns of Ontario legislators were tested. It is now necessary to outline the hypotheses, and the results of the tests.

¹Included in this second mailing to Progressive Conservative caucus members was a cover letter provided by Mr. John Smith, Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Education, which urged completion of the questionnaire.

²For the actual response rates by party see Table I.

TABLE I
RESPONSE PATTERNS BY PARTY

PARTY	POSSIBLE RESPONSE	ACTUAL RETURN	USEFUL RETURN ¹	USEFUL RETURN ²
Progressive Conservative	76 (100%)	38 (50%)	35 (46%)	31 (41%)
Liberal	22 (100%)	13 (59%)	13 (59%)	12 (55%)
New Democratic Party	19 (100%)	16 (84%)	16 (84%)	15 (79%)
	— —	— —	— —	— —
Total	117 (100%)	67 (57%)	64 (55%)	58 (50%)
	— —	— —	— —	— —

¹One questionnaire was returned after analysis of the data had started and was therefore not included in any of the computations. Two replies had more than 50% of the questions unanswered and were thus deemed to be unacceptable for analytical purposes.

²Not all respondents completed all the questions on the survey. A total of six respondents had eight or more ideological question unanswered. It was felt that such a large number of missing values would prevent accurate factor scores from being calculated. As a result all statistics relating to factor score or discriminant analysis are based on the fifty-eight returns in this group.

CHAPTER III

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Attitude Structure and Political Orientation

The questionnaire that was circulated to Ontario MLA's included thirty-seven questions designed to reveal political attitudes.¹ These questions encompassed a wide range of areas. Some of the questions, particularly those dealing with religious groups and foreign countries, were not important for their superficial elements but for the connotations that they entailed. In other words, many of the questions functioned as symbols for much larger concepts. For example, the legislators were asked to express the type of feelings they held for such organizations as the Lions Club and the Empire Club. The Lions Club embodies the values held and endorsed by the middle class in Ontario, if not in Canadian, society. The Empire Club, on the other hand, is a creature of affluent upper-middle and upper classes. While the Empire Club has lost a

¹The questionnaire was constructed under the close supervision of Dr. Winn, who wished to discover the relevance to the provincial party system of his spatial models of the federal party system. See Conrad Winn, "Spatial Models of Party Systems: An Examination of the Canadian Case," University of Pennsylvania doctoral dissertation, 1972. See also Conrad Winn and John McMenemy, "Political Alignment in a Polarized City: Electoral Cleavages in Kitchener, Ontario," Canadian Journal of Political Science (June, 1973).

considerable degree of its exclusiveness, it retains the image of a privileged elite based on the circumstances of an earlier age. The Lions Club provides an adequate symbol for the goals and demands of a middle class society. The Empire Club performs the analogous function for the upper class. By expressing their feelings on such organizations, the legislators express to some extent how well their personal goals and demands fit those established by the various classes.

It should be noted that no single symbol could be found to represent the lower-middle and lower class. No organization builds its ideals fully around the goals of the lower classes. It may be argued that labour unions espouse the cause of the workingman but the unionized occupations are not synonymous with the lower classes. A number of measures must be employed to reflect the divisions within the lower sections of society. The feelings of legislators toward labour leaders, factory workers and farmers may represent together a more accurate reflection of opinion toward lower social strata than any single variable.¹

¹It is felt that legislators will perceive the lower class differently depending upon the socio-economic milieu from which they come. The workingman may not represent the interests of the lower class to a legislator that is from a rural area. As a result more than one measure of the lower class was felt to be necessary.

Numerous questions were devised to test other areas of concern. Included in these areas of concentration are: the role of the government in the economy and society generally, the rights of the individual, ethnic and religious prejudice, nationalism, welfarism, and corporatism. The preceding is certainly not meant to be an exhaustive list of the concerns found in the questionnaire. However, these are the central themes that formed the basis for the construction of attitudinal patterns. When constructing attitudinal patterns one must be cognizant of the fact that some of the symbols represent more than one area of concern and as such are difficult to classify into one particular category.

As Eysenck states, attitudes show a considerable degree of organization or structure. The fact that an individual holds a particular attitude carries with it implications about other attitudes.¹ The attitudes of legislators on matters representing the diverse areas of concern can be consolidated into an overall pattern of attitudes. An attitude related to the role of the government may be correlated to a position that the legislator took on the role of traditions within society. If a pattern can be established for a number of areas then the political orientations of legislators can be determined.

¹Eysenck, op. cit., p. 265.

The initial step towards the identification of attitudinal patterns is the calculation of the correlation coefficients.¹ A correlation coefficient measures the extent to which variation in the dependent variable is associated with the variation in the independent variable.² It is on the basis of correlation between variables that the attitudinal patterns will be established.

The actual procedure employed to isolate patterns is factor analysis. Factor analysis clusters variables into groups that can be said to represent a certain conceptual dimension. As a result each factor can be considered a composite variable made up of a number of discrete variables that are related. Each relevant variable is said to load on the factor. The loading is a statistical measure of the degree to which a factor predicts a variable. Thus the loading is similar to correlation coefficients except that one measures the degree of

¹Appendix II is the presentation of a Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for the thirty-seven questions dealing with ideology.

²A common mistake in the interpretation of correlation coefficients is the belief that a high value for a coefficient is brought about by dispersion in the amounts of the separate variables. It is not possible to say that high levels of cohesion in a legislative body explain the presence of low correlation coefficients. Differences in the absolute values has no bearing on the size of the coefficient. Only the extent to which variations are associated can affect the value of the coefficient. See Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chamber of a State Legislature." Western Political Quarterly, XIV (1961), 473 - 480.

association between concrete variables and the other the association between a discrete variable and an abstract variable. Factor analysis will go beyond correlation coefficients and construct a number of abstract variables with each new variable representing a particular dimension in the data.¹

A factor analysis was performed on the survey data and the results are presented in Table II.² Essentially six conceptual patterns exist. However of these six only three appear to be worthy of significant discussion. The three most important variables account for almost eighty-three percent of the common variance in the factor structure. The remaining three factors between them account for only sixteen percent of the common variance. In addition, the three less significant

¹For a much more detailed account of the mechanics and purpose of factor analysis see R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI (1967), 444 - 480.

²The factor analysis was of an R-type and was produced using the factor analysis programme contained in SPSS. The full sixty-four cases were used in the computation with pairwise deletion for missing values being in effect. PA2 with iterations was the factoring method. The number of factors extracted was equal to the number of factors with an eigenvalue greater than or equal to 1.0. The factors were rotated by means of the varimax method. For an explanation of the factor analysis programme see Norman Nie; Dale H. Dent; and Hadlai C. Hull, SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw - Hill, 1970).

TABLE II
ROTATED FACTORS, ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
<u>Tory Factor</u>						
Anglicans	.73	.22	.00	.12	.16	.01
Monarchy	.72	-.07	.12	-.12	.00	.00
Empire Club	.72	-.15	<u>.47</u>	-.18	.04	-.20
Britain	.72	.24	-.09	-.04	-.09	-.04
Lions Club	.70	-.07	.20	.00	.18	-.03
Canadian Manufacturers Association	.62	<u>-.31</u>	<u>.50</u>	-.17	.05	-.08
Farmers	.62	.08	.14	.05	.04	-.25
Traditions	.51	-.27	.21	-.09	-.05	.19
Orange Lodge	.46	.16	<u>.41</u>	-.14	-.07	-.03
Separate School Support	-.45	.29	-.04	.30	.13	<u>.34</u>
Auto	-.46	<u>.45</u>	-.25	.04	-.07	<u>.44</u>
<u>Socialist Factor</u>						
Women's Liberation	-.07	<u>.69</u>	-.12	.03	.02	.15
North Vietnam	-.18	.68	-.06	.23	-.08	.06
Union Leadership	-.15	.68	.03	.06	.19	.10
Welfare Recipients	.14	.68	-.06	.13	-.16	-.25
Community Action Groups	.11	.66	.03	.03	<u>.30</u>	.20
Underdeveloped Nations	.15	.66	-.05	.06	.09	-.23

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Factory Workers	<u>.30</u>	.63	.01	.17	.09	.09
Welfare Programmes	-.27	.60	.02	.10	-.11	.05
University Professors	.05	.54	.03	.23	.21	-.03
Pollution Probe	.11	.51	-.09	.09	.27	.16
Nationalization of Industries	-. <u>47</u>	.51	-.24	.12	-.24	.23
Prevent Takeovers by Foreign Corporations	-.07	.35	-. <u>30</u>	-.07	.13	.11
Free Enterprise	<u>.50</u>	-.56	.31	-.24	.09	.02

Whig Factor

Land Developers	.26	-.07	.67	.08	.05	-.18
Corporation Executives	<u>.53</u>	-.27	.65	.11	-.13	.05
United States	<u>.39</u>	-.06	.60	.07	-. <u>44</u>	.11
Ontario Medical Association	<u>.40</u>	.03	.45	-.08	.05	-. <u>33</u>
Censorship Cannot be Justified Except in time of War	.09	.00	-.61	.10	-.22	-.02

Cultural Liberalism Factor

Jews	<u>.39</u>	<u>.30</u>	.06	.59	.22	.02
French Canadians	<u>.33</u>	<u>.36</u>	.12	.47	.13	-.09
Federal Government has too much Power	.27	.00	-.02	-.40	-.10	-.11

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Police Power	.18	-.20	.18	-.45	.11	-.15
Prevent Immigration of Certain Groups	.26	-.30	.03	-.57	-.08	.21

Collectivism Factor

Committee for an Independent Canada	.26	.38	-.10	.18	.69	.16
Abortion and the Individual	-.03	-.09	-.30	-.17	-.58	.25

Statism Factor

Government Role in the Economy	-.10	.43	-.20	.07	-.07	.50
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Percent Common Variance	44.6	29.6	8.4	7.3	5.8	5.2
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Eigenvalue	9.1	6.0	1.7	1.4	1.0	1.0
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factors have a very limited number of variables with high loadings. Because of their much greater statistical significance, factors I, II, and III will receive preferred attention in the analysis that follows.

Factor I clearly represents the traditional and established elements within the province. Among the variables with high loadings on this factor are: the Empire Club, Canadian Manufacturer's Association, Lions Club and Anglicans. All of these variables are symbols of established power and the status quo. However also loading on Factor I are positive feelings towards: the monarchy, Great Britain, the Orange Lodge, and farmers. The factor includes opposition to the extension of aid to Roman Catholic Separate Schools. As such, the factor incorporates rural-oriented Protestantism with support for the British connection and the established order within the province. Factor I can be identified as representing the Tory streak that is said to exist in Canadian politics.¹

Factor II is totally dissimilar from the first. In the place of established groups and institutions are variables representing such groups as: Women's Liberation, union leadership, welfare recipients, community action groups, factory workers, university professors, and Pollution Probe. These groups tend either to lack power

¹See Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), pp. 1 - 54. In that section Horowitz provides an operational definition of the term Tory. The terms Whig and Socialist, which are used throughout this study, are also defined.

or to be associated with the lower levels of the social structure. Factor II encompasses support for: the nationalization of select industries, the introduction of a government-operated automobile insurance programme, the prevention of takeovers of Canadian industries by foreign corporations, and the extension of welfare programmes. Factor II represents a left-wing or socialist-oriented dimension.

Loading on Factor III are a number of economic interest groups including the Ontario Medical Association and the Canadian Manufacturers Association. In a general way Factor III tends to include support for corporation executives, land developers, and the values, interests and beliefs as represented by the United States. This factor could presumably be classified as an economic liberalism factor. One weak point in this conclusion is that a belief in the use of censorship also loads highly on this factor. Thus the factor tends to go beyond a simple incorporation of laissez-faire economic principles. The willingness to compromise personal liberty makes the factor closely akin to the ideals of Whigism.

The remaining three factors represent less statistically important dimensions. Factor IV with its high loadings on ethnic minorities and support for Roman Catholic Separate Schools indicates an attitudinal

dimension associated with cultural liberalism. This conclusion is re-enforced by the fact that a desire to prevent the immigration of certain racial and religious groups receives a significant negative loading on the factor. Factor V outlines a concern for society as a whole. It deals with the role which the community must play in relation to the individual. The stance adopted in Factor V can be classed as a collectivist position. The matter of abortion is seen as a decision to be made by more than just the individual involved. High loadings for the Committee for an Independent Canada and community action groups generally illustrates faith in the community approach to problem solving. The final factor has a very limited number of variables loading on it, but those variables that do load either favour expansion of the role of government in society or curtailment of interests in the private sector. Therefore Factor VI might be said to be a 'statism' factor and as such is closely related to the socialist factor.

Through factor analysis the attitude patterns of Ontario legislators have been constructed. This construction does not require the same a priori considerations as the Rice and Beyle techniques. Factor analysis provides for a maximum of flexibility and a minimum

of researcher error.¹ The ideological patterns furnished by factor analysis provide the basis for more sophisticated investigation into party solidarity and cohesion.

Partisanship and Party Stability

The attitudinal patterns of individual legislators can be compared through the computation of factor scores.² Differences in raw scores reveal little about the

¹This proposition has been examined in Chapter I.

²Factor scores are computed using the following equation:

$$FS^1 = (L_1 \times (X_1 - \bar{X}_1) / SD_1) + (L_2 \times (X_2 - \bar{X}_2) / SD_2) + \dots (L_n \times (X_n - \bar{X}_n) / SD_n)$$

A factor score is computed for each case for each significant factor. Thus in the present study each MLA would have six factor scores with one score corresponding with each of the factors outlined in Table II. In the computation of the factor scores only those variables which have a significant loading on the factor are added to the equation. Therefore the example given above can be interpreted in the following manner. The factor score for individual X on factor one is equal to the loading of the first significant variable on factor one multiplied by the difference between the value individual X assigned to variable one and the overall mean value assigned to the variable by all respondents. The resulting figure is then divided by the standard deviation associated with the mean of the variable. This procedure is repeated for each variable that loads significantly on the factor. The figures are then summed to arrive at the factor score.

In this study relatively small scores mean that the attitudes of the individual legislator are similar to the average of the legislature. A high positive value symbolizes basic disagreement with the attributes represented by the factor. By the same token, a negative value of some magnitude represents agreement.

attitudinal pattern which the legislator favours. Scores are only comparable between legislators on one factor at a time. It is possible that the legislators could be divided into sub-groups and the mean scores of these groupings be compared by a difference of means test. At the most such an approach could utilize an analysis of variance test to consider the differences between groups and the variations within the groups. Such procedures do not isolate individuals who should not be members of the sub-group. Instead the values of the factor scores of these misclassified individuals are included in the calculation of the group mean which ultimately affects the results of the test. Therefore a procedure is needed which will take the factor scores and divide the legislators into the most effective and cohesive sub-groups.

Such a result could be achieved through the use of discriminant analysis.¹ Discriminant analysis takes an established group division, constructs an overall pattern for each sub-group and then tests how well each individual conforms to the sub-group pattern. The probability of each individual fitting into a sub-group is then determined.¹ If there is a legislator whose

¹For an explanation of discriminant analysis see: W.J. Dixon, ed. BMD (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 96 - 112.

attitudinal pattern is better matched with a sub-group other than the one to which he was originally designated then the legislator is re-assigned. The problem of testing ideological solidarity can therefore be approached in two ways. First, the factor scores can be used to place MLA's into hypothetical ideological groupings.² Second, assignment to an a priori grouping could be done on the basis of the party affiliation of the respondent. No matter which method of group assignment is used the procedure that follows is the same. The variables on which the programme is to discriminate are fed into the system.² Group patterns are calculated and the probability of a member belonging to each sub-group is computed.

¹This procedure involves the placing of all members into a group that corresponds to the factor on which a negative factor score was obtained. For convenience sake only the three most significant factors were considered. An assumption was made that the groupings were not mutually exclusive. It is possible that a member could have a negative factor score on more than one factor. In this circumstance the legislator was placed in both sub-groupings. In two instances a negative score was not obtained on any of the factors. In these cases the members were arbitrarily assigned to the group which corresponded to the lowest positive value.

²The variable input which is used can be varied. In this study six basic runs were made. Discriminant analysis was applied to the sub-groups on the basis of: all ideological variables; Tory, Socialist and Whig variables; constituency variables, and; personal characteristics.

The arrangement of ideological blocs constructed using the factor score method is shown in Table III.¹ The blocs are basically analogous to the present party structure. Sixty-five percent of the Progressive Conservative respondents qualify as Tories, forty-two percent of the Liberals as Whigs and one hundred percent of New Democrats as Socialists. This means that New Democrats tend to be the most ideologically cohesive. Progressive Conservatives tend to overlap into the Whig category to some extent. The Liberals appear to be the most diversified. The party is almost equally divided between the three ideological camps. In addition, none of the three blocs is dominated by members of the Liberal party.²

¹This breakdown used all ideological variables.

²If the responses are taken as representative of all MLA's then the breakdown of the blocs for the entire legislature would be:

	TORY	WHIG	SQC.	TOTAL
PC	47 (65%) (90%)	29 (35%) (76%)	-	76 (100%)
LIB	6 (25%) (10%)	9 (42%) (24%)	7 (33%) (28%)	22 (100%)
NDP	-	-	19 (100%) (72%)	19 (100%)
	—	—	—	—
	53 (100%)	38 (100%)	26 (100%)	117
	—	—	—	—

TABLE III
MEMBERSHIP OF IDEOLOGICAL BLOCS BY PARTY

PARTY	TORY	WHIG	SOCIALIST	TOTAL
Progressive Conservative	20 (65%) (87%)	11 (35%) (69%)	-	31 (100%)
Liberal	3 (25%) (13%)	5 (42%) (31%)	4 (33%) (21%)	12 (100%)
New Democratic Party	-	-	15 (100%) (79%)	15 (100%)
	—	—	—	—
Total	23 (100%)	16 (100%)	19 (100%)	58
	—	—	—	—

Another measure of the different ideologies held by the parties and blocs is available by comparing the factor scores. The scores are outlined in Table IV. The Progressive Conservative Party's identification with Toryism is borne out by the fact that it is the only party to have a negative factor score on the Tory factor. Similarly, on the Socialist factor the New Democrats are the only party to be closely associated. On the Whig factor the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals both have negative means with the Conservatives having the most negative score. On all of these scores the Liberals have a mean which falls between the Progressive Conservatives and the New Democrats. Such a result may in fact substantiate Table III's finding that the Liberals are the least cohesive of the parties. Their position between the Conservatives and the New Democrats allows the party to have wings in the Tory and Socialist blocs as well as the Whig group.¹

Another method of testing the stability of parties is to use the party affiliation of MLA's when constructing the hypothetical groups for purposes of discriminant analysis. When this method is used it is found that all

¹It is interesting to note that on the remaining three factors the Progressive Conservatives maintain a positive value while the two opposition parties hold negative values. As a result the Conservatives can be said to be more distantly associated with the ideals of cultural liberalism, collectivism and statism.

TABLE IV

FACTOR SCORES BY PARTY AND BLOC

PARTY OR BLOC	FACTOR I	FACTOR II	FACTOR III	FACTOR IV	FACTOR V	FACTOR VI
PC	-3.75	2.95	-1.75	.71	.26	.81
Liberal	1.20	.23	-.40	-.91	-.22	-.22
NDP	6.94	-7.21	4.15	-.85	-.37	-1.46
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Tory	-3.62	3.36	-.92	.83	.26	.72
Whig	-1.77	2.09	-2.37	-.07	.32	.47
Socialist	6.00	-6.56	3.27	-1.02	-.60	-1.30

party members are properly classified.¹ However when the ideological variables are broken down into the various factors cracks begin to appear in the party hegemony. On the basis of only Tory variables one Progressive Conservative and one Liberal are incorrectly classified. When Socialist variables are considered four Conservatives hold attitudes that are more similar to the attitudes held by the Liberal Party than those espoused by their own party. By the same token one Liberal should be reclassified as a Progressive Conservative. Whig variables bring about the greatest amount of dissension. Based on Whig variables five Conservatives should be Liberals while three Liberals should be Conservatives and one Liberal should be a member of the New Democratic Party caucus. Therefore on the basis of the three subdivisions in the ideological variables the conclusions arrived at by using the factor score method are confirmed.

All New Democrats are correctly classified. This tends to support the finding that New Democrats are more ideologically cohesive than the other parties. The Progressive Conservatives had ninety-three possibilities to be misclassified but in actual fact only ten members or 10.8% were incorrectly grouped. The Liberals on the other hand had thirty-six chances to be designated incorrectly and six members or 16.7% of the party caucus was improperly classified.

¹See Table V for discriminant classification of party members by ideological variables.

TABLE V

DISCRIMINANT CLASSIFICATION OF PARTY MEMBERS BY IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES

<u>All Ideological Variables</u>					<u>Socialist Variables</u>				
P R A T I C A L V A R I A B L E S		HYPOTHETICAL PARTIES			P R A T I C A L V A R I A B L E S		HYPOTHETICAL PARTIES		
		PC	LIB	NDP			PC	LIB	NDP
	PC	31	0	0		PC	27	4	0
	LIB	0	12	0		LIB	1	11	0
	NDP	0	0	15		NDP	0	0	15
		—	—	—			—	—	—
		31	12	15			28	15	15
<u>Tory Variables</u>					<u>Whig Variables</u>				
P R A T I C A L V A R I A B L E S		HYPOTHETICAL PARTIES			P R A T I C A L V A R I A B L E S		HYPOTHETICAL PARTIES		
		PC	LIB	NDP			PC	LIB	NDP
	PC	30	1	0		PC	26	5	0
	LIB	1	11	0		LIB	3	8	1
	NDP	0	0	15		NDP	0	0	15
		—	—	—			—	—	—
		31	12	15			29	13	16

Discriminant analysis provides an estimate of the probability of the individual belonging to each sub-group. The mean and mode probabilities of party members belonging to their present party is outlined in Table VI. The probabilities are a more accurate method of measuring the cohesion which was outlined in the previous paragraph. For this reason the breakdown as given by mean and mode probabilities is identical to the method in the previous paragraph but the measure is given greater statistical precision.

In calculating the ideological patterns, discriminant analysis orders the variables which are the most important in calculating the patterns. The order, and relative strength, of each variable in distinguishing between groups is important to a discussion of the groups. If all the variables are characterized as being political, economic or cultural it is found that variables dealing with economics, that is variables characterizing a free enterprise - socialist split, tend to be the most powerful variables for distinguishing one party from another. Variables dealing with cultural and political issues generally appear to be of lesser importance. This distinction holds true not only for all ideological variables but also for the Tory, Socialist and Whig variables.¹

¹For a complete breakdown see Appendix IX.

TABLE VI
PROBABILITY OF PARTY MEMBERS BELONGING
TO THEIR RESPECTIVE PARTIES

PARTY	ALL IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES		TORY VARIABLES		WHIG VARIABLES		SOCIALIST VARIABLES		AVERAGE	
	MEAN	MODE	MEAN	MODE	MEAN	MODE	MEAN	MODE	MEAN	MODE
PC	1.000	1.000	.914	.996	.826	.947	.692	.766	.811	.870
LIB	1.000	1.000	.904	.997	.875	.926	.548	.656	.778	.769
NDP	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	.982	1.000	.994	1.000

Finally, discriminant analysis allows a functional equation to be derived to compute the probability of any given individual fitting into a sub-group. Thus where the attitudes of an individual are known it is possible to estimate the party affiliation and ideological bloc to which that individual is most likely to belong.¹

Such a function obviously gives the researcher the ability to determine the direction a party's ideology is moving by employing the same equations at future dates. As a result the degree to which party ideology remains stable and solidarity continues at its present level can be calculated when new members are added to the party caucus.

Socio-Economic Indicators

Not all parties draw their support equally from all groups across the province. The parties appeal to different socio-economic groupings and this appeal is reflected in the make-up of the party caucus. If the constituency affects the attitudes held by legislators, then the members of an ideological bloc should have constituencies which show greater similarities with other bloc members than with other party members.

¹The discriminant functions to determine the probability of party affiliation based on all ideological variables are presented in Appendix VIII.

Table VII compares the constituency characteristics of both party and bloc members. If one accepts earlier findings that each party basically corresponds to a bloc then the changes in constituency characteristics should correspond to what the 'true party' should be. Therefore it was not totally unexpected to find that Tories represent rural-Protestant constituencies, even more so than the Progressive Conservatives.¹ Whigs, on the other hand, become perceptively more urban (though less dominated by industrial workers) than Liberal members. The characteristics held by Socialists remain about identical to those evidenced by New Democrats.²

A similar comparison may be made between the party members who belong to different ideological blocs. Progressive Conservatives who are Tories represent ridings which are consistently less urban and contain lower percentages of workers and Roman Catholics than ridings held by Conservatives who are Whigs. Liberal Tories follow the same pattern. The percentage of urban-dwellers, industrial workers, and Roman Catholics are below the Liberal Party average. At the same time these indicators

¹Constituency characteristics are based on subjective measures provided by the legislators. As a result the figures need not represent perfectly the actual situation.

²This may be taken as a further reason for the ideological cohesion of the NDP, ie. a homogeneous constituency base.

TABLE VII
CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS BY PARTY AND BLOC

CHARACTERISTIC ¹	PC	TORY	LIB	WHIG	NDP	SOC.	OVERALL
Urban	71.39	66.30	69.67	73.94	88.80	88.05	75.53
Farmers	20.71	26.04	23.17	17.69	2.07	3.63	16.40
Workers	30.58	29.70	39.33	32.63	54.00	53.95	38.45
Catholics	32.80	29.48	37.92	38.69	44.53	44.36	36.89
Distance	155.03	160.26	118.00	136.75	219.07	191.26	163.93

¹All figures are expressed in terms of percentages, except Distance which is in the form of miles from Queen's Park.

are higher than the Liberal Party norm for Socialist Liberals.¹

Just as parties can be distinguished on the basis of ideology they can be distinguished using constituency characteristics. A discriminant analysis using constituency variables to distinguish the parties was performed. The results of the analysis found that eleven Progressive Conservatives, five Liberals and four New Democrats should be members of other parties.² If constituency features did in fact influence the legislator's attitudes then the factor scores of the party members who were misclassified should be significantly different from other party members. Table X outlines the results. No consistent pattern emerges. It is found that Conservatives who represent constituencies similar to Liberal or NDP constituencies tend to be more intensely Tory but also more in favour of Whig and Socialist ideals. Thus it would appear that Conservatives from atypical constituencies try to be all things to all people. Liberals representing Conservative-style constituencies tend to be more anti-Tory and anti-Socialist than other

¹Since all New Democrats fall within the Socialist bloc no breakdown for that party is conceivable. See Table VIII.

²The discriminant classification of party members by constituency and personal variables is given in Table IX.

TABLE VIII

CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS OF BLOC MEMBERS BY PARTY

CHARACTER- ISTIC ¹	PC			LIBERAL			NDP		
	TORY	WHIG	SOC.	TORY	WHIG	SOC.	TORY	WHIG	SOC.
Urban	69.3	74.8	-	46.7	71.0	85.3	-	-	88.8
Farmers	23.5	16.3	-	43.3	22.0	9.5	-	-	2.1
Workers	30.3	33.2	-	25.7	36.0	50.0	-	-	54.5
Catholics	29.2	37.4	-	31.7	37.0	50.0	-	-	44.5
Distance	159.8	133.0	-	163.3	115.6	87.0	-	-	219.1

¹All figures are expressed in terms of percentages, except Distance which is in the form of miles from Queen's Park.

TABLE IX
DISCRIMINANT CLASSIFICATION OF PARTY MEMBERS
BY CONSTITUENCY AND PERSONAL VARIABLES

<u>Personal Characteristics</u>				
		HYPOTHETICAL PARTIES		
		PC	LIB	NDP
P R E A T I O N A L V A R I A B L E S	PC	18	5	8
	LIB	2	10	0
	NDP	1	1	13
		—	—	—
		21	16	21

<u>Constituency Characteristics</u>				
		HYPOTHETICAL PARTIES		
		PC	LIB	NDP
P R E A T I O N A L V A R I A B L E S	PC	20	7	4
	LIB	3	7	2
	NDP	2	2	11
		—	—	—
		25	16	17

TABLE X
MEAN SCORES ON IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS FOR NEW
PARTY SUB-GROUPS CREATED BY DISCRIMINANT
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUENCY FEATURES¹

PARTY	SUB- GROUP	TORY FACTOR	SOCIALIST FACTOR	WHIG FACTOR
PC		-3.75	2.95	-1.75
	PC	-2.93	3.91	-1.13
	LIB	-4.49	1.26	-1.86
	NDP	-6.55	.85	-4.41
LIB		1.20	.23	-.40
	PC	3.57	7.51	.36
	LIB	.10	-1.70	-.51
	NDP	1.49	-3.93	-1.16
NDP		6.94	-7.21	4.15
	PC	4.66	-6.94	2.35
	LIB	12.22	-7.12	6.32
	NDP	6.40	-7.28	4.08

¹Table X identifies party sub-groups on the basis of discriminant analysis of constituency variables. By this discriminant analysis three new party sub-groups are created for each real party caucus. For the three real party caucuses and the nine hypothetical party sub-groups the factor scores are presented.

party members. Those Liberals who are closely associated with NDP-type constituencies also tend to be more anti-Tory but at the same time more Whigish and Socialist. New Democrats, who on the basis of constituency variables should belong to other parties, remain almost equally committed to socialist ideals. However, if a New Democrat represents a Conservative riding he is less opposed to Tory and Whig ideals. Thus while no consistent pattern emerges it is evident that constituency features have affected the legislator's attitudes. Depending upon the party that the legislator represents it may bias him towards or against the ideology of the party that should prepresent his constituency. Generally speaking, constituency features appear to have a significant impact on ideology and party cohesion. A more detailed inquiry into the constituency influence will be undertaken, along with an investigation of other relationships, through the use of specific hypotheses.

CHAPTER IV

SOLIDARITY AND THE PARTIES OF ONTARIO

Introduction

The previous chapter established the pattern of political orientations of Ontario legislators. Chapter III did not attempt to construct orientation pattern through the use of explicit hypotheses. Rather the structure of ideological groupings was approached in a very general fashion. Factor analysis was performed on the responses to ideological questions and this allowed patterns of attitudes to be isolated. Discriminant analysis picked up on these attitude patterns and allocated individual legislators into blocs and parties on the basis of the relationship between the attitudinal positions of the individual and the positions of the parties and blocs. The combination of factor analysis and discriminant analysis techniques permitted construction of "natural" ideological blocs. However, the determination of the ideological limits of the blocs and parties does not answer questions related to the influence of party, constituency and electoral margin on ideology. Thus Chapter IV will seek to measure the impact of these influences. In order to accomplish this, specific hypotheses will be applied to the foundations established in the previous chapter.

Hypotheses

Using the data collected through the survey the following hypotheses were tested:

Hypothesis I:

Members who represent constituencies with similar demographic characteristics will have similar attitudinal patterns

From the earlier review of existing studies, the purpose of this hypothesis may already be clear. Ontario is a diverse province in terms of socio-economic make-up. There exist cleavages in the population based on religion, class, ethnic origin and urban-rural differences.¹

Hypothesis I posits the belief that similar types of socio-economic environments produce dispositions to hold similar attitudes on a variety of issues. The assumption lying at the base of this hypothesis is that a constituency chooses a legislator who so shares the views of the constituency that in following his own personal beliefs he is fulfilling the demands of the constituency.

¹A decision was reached not to include a measure of ethnicity because ethnicity cannot readily be tested on an interval or ordinal scale. However, it may be noted that previous studies have shown a high association between ethnicity and religion. While it is not suggested that religion is a substitute for ethnicity, the fact that there exists a high correlation between the two variables indicates that the inclusion of ethnicity would likely only re-enforce the results.

Hypothesis II:

The most marked difference in attitudes will be between members representing urban constituencies and members from rural districts

This hypothesis is an extension of the principles contained in Hypothesis I. If individual legislators reflect the feelings of their constituents, then their attitudinal differences should correspond to the demographic differences of their constituencies.

Hypothesis III:

The greater the size of the parliamentary caucus, the lower the level of cohesion and solidarity

Not only are there differences in the socio-economic make-up of the one hundred and seventeen constituencies but there are also wide variations in the sectional or regional interests represented. According to this hypothesis, the electoral success of a party is proportional to its ability to represent varying interests. It would thus hold that the greater the number of seats a party wins, the greater the number of factional interests represented in its caucus. If constituency features influence the attitudes held by a legislator, then the party representing the most interests, or the winning party, will be the the most factional and the least cohesive.

Hypothesis IV:

Members representing constituencies atypical
of the party will hold attitudes
distinguishable from the
majority of the party

This hypothesis follows directly from the reasoning underlying some of the previous hypotheses.

Hypothesis V:

For any given party, members with small electoral
margins in their constituencies will be closer
in attitude to the beliefs of the local
opposition party than will members
with large electoral margins

It appears reasonable to assume that the legislator's principal interest is his own election. When his electoral margin is small, he must make special efforts to identify himself publicly with the attitudes of voters who do not normally support his party. By virtue of the tendency to minimize cognitive dissonance, the legislator will become personally more sympathetic to the values of the main family of voters whose support he seeks.

Hypothesis VI:

In constituencies typical of those represented by
a party, a member's electoral success is a
function of the extent that his
attitudes conform to those of
his party leadership

Not all legislators reflect the influences of their constituencies. Legislators who deviate from the attitudes of the party norm, even though they represent constituencies in which their election is dependant upon the loyalty of groups previously committed to that party, are more likely to have a smaller plurality than their colleagues representing similar constituencies. Such a belief is based on the idea that the legislators' deviation from the party line will alienate certain segments of groups that would ordinarily support the candidate of the party. This alienation, and possible desertion from the party, results in an electoral margin narrower than would normally be expected.

Hypothesis VII:

The greater the role of party leadership in
recruiting the member, the more likely the
member will follow the party norm

Active recruitment by the party of candidates would appear to be one of the chief methods of ensuring loyalty to the party values. First, the party would generally pursue those individuals whose attitudes and beliefs already conform with those of the party. Second, active party recruitment would heighten the sense of obligation that a legislator would feel towards his party.

Hypothesis VIII:

Members who hold attitudes that differ from the party norm will tend to value the importance of the constituency more highly than loyalty to the party

When a legislator values constituency interests highly and the demographic portrait of that constituency is atypical of his party, he is likely to be subject to pressures encouraging him to adopt attitudes atypical of his party. Therefore most legislators seek to find a justification for their actions. By placing an emphasis on the role of the constituency a member can easily accept and rationalize the differences between the attitudes held by the party and his own personal convictions.

Hypothesis IX:

Members who hold attitudes different from the
party norm will perceive themselves as
uninfluential in party affairs

Member with attitudes differing from those of the party's majority will perceive that they are distant from the leadership of their party and as a result are unable to exert as much influence on the decisions of the party as their colleagues.

Statistical Tests

Hypothesis I:

A considerable amount of attention has been focused on the subject of constituency influence and the attitudes of elected politicians. In the previous chapter references were made to differences in demographic features that exist between the constituencies of party and bloc members. The tables outline only the raw score differences and do not establish whether a statistical significance can be attached to such variations.

Hypothesis I can be supported statistically. First, the confidence limits for the party means are computed. If ideology is affected by the demographic

features of the constituency, the riding characteristics of blocs should provide a more distinct breakdown.¹

Table XI outlines the confidence limits for the parties and blocs. The intervals are illustrated in Figures I and II. The confidence limits provide evidence that the constituency does in fact affect the attitudes of legislators. The variations evidenced in Table XI and Figures I and II are borne out by a chi-square test. The differences in the demographic characteristics associated with both party and bloc members are significant at the .001 level of significance.²

Hypothesis II:

In this study only four major features of an M.L.A.'s constituency were taken into account. Two of these characteristics are measures relevant to the

¹This result can be expected even though it is maintained that the parties are already influenced by constituency characteristics. If legislators from similar ridings coalesce around certain attitudes then by studying blocs the influence of legislators from atypical constituencies should be eliminated since these atypical legislators would be associated with other blocs.

²The calculated chi-square value for parties is 24.3. The chi-square value for blocs is even greater coming to 32.0. To be significant at the .05 level of significance a chi-square value of at least 9.488 would have been necessary. The .01 level is associated with the figure 13.217 and the .001 level with 18.465.

TABLE XI
CONFIDENCE LIMITS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES¹

VARIABLE	PC	LIBERAL	NDP
Urban	61.7 - 81.1	55.3 - 84.0	76.9 - 100.0
Farmers	12.8 - 28.7	10.5 - 35.9	0.0 - 4.7
Workers	24.4 - 36.8	27.4 - 48.7	46.7 - 61.3
Catholics	26.3 - 39.3	29.8 - 50.3	38.8 - 50.3
	TORY	WHIG	SOCIALIST
Urban	55.1 - 77.5	60.3 - 87.5	78.2 - 97.9
Farmers	16.7 - 35.4	7.0 - 28.4	0.0 - 7.3
Workers	23.5 - 35.9	22.9 - 42.4	47.1 - 60.8
Catholics	22.3 - 36.7	30.6 - 46.8	39.3 - 49.5

¹All figures are expressed in terms of percent.

FIGURE I
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OF DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES
BY PARTY





FIGURE II
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OF DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES

BY BLOC



the urban - rural cleavage. First, there is the percentage of the constituency which is made up of urban dwellers. The second characteristic, the percentage of farmers in the population of a riding, may appear to be the complement of the urban variable. In actual fact, the measures are not perfectly correlated. Not everyone who lives in a rural setting is a farmer. This fact is particularly evident in Northern Ontario, where ridings are composed neither of urban centres or farmers.

If political attitudes are not affected by urban - rural differences among ridings, political attitudes may nevertheless be influenced by the class and/or cultural characteristics of ridings. Class differences can be made operational as the percentage of industrial workers in a riding. The importance of a religious - ethnic cleavage can be tested through the use of a variable measuring the proportion of Roman Catholics in a constituency. It should be recognized that these variables do not operate in isolation. For example, urban constituencies have a greater possibility of containing industrial workers since commerce is concentrated in the urban centres. Industrial workers also tend to contain a higher proportion of Roman Catholics and other ethnic minorities. The overlapping

of these variables in particular instances does not mean that the pattern is consistent for the entire province. The overlapping does mean that each characteristic is a potentially powerful predictor of attitudes. The most powerful variable can be identified by statistically controlling the influence of the other variables.

The members were divided into blocs. Once the members were assigned to blocs, overall means on the four demographic features were computed. Two statistical measures were employed to evaluate the relative power of each variable. Use of the tau statistic achieved a score of zero for all variables. Similarly the lambda statistic produced a zero result for all measures except the percentage of farmers.¹

When the demographic variables were used to test the cohesion of parties through discriminant analysis the four variables were listed in order of importance.²

¹The value of lambda for the farmers variable is .07 which is a relatively minimal value. For a full explanation of the tau and lambda statistics see Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw - Hill, 1972), pp. 300 - 303.

²Discriminant analysis orders variables in accordance with their relative importance. In addition, the programme assigns a weight to this importance which is known as the U-statistic. The U-statistic for the four relevant variables are: Industrial Workers .7474; Farmers .5659; Roman Catholics .5297 and; Urban .5026.

In discriminant analysis it was found that the percentage of workers was the most important distinguishing feature followed by the percentage of farmers, Roman Catholics and urban residents. As a result the tests for this hypothesis are inconclusive. All four features are almost equally important in their predictive ability.

Hypothesis III:

The results of the study would tend to disprove the concept that the greater the size of the parliamentary caucus the lower the level of cohesion and solidarity. Reference must first be made to Tables V and VI. These tables show that the Liberal Party tends to be the least cohesive. The Liberal members have the lowest probability of belonging to their own party. In addition the Liberal caucus contains the highest percentage of members who on the basis of their attitudes should be members of other parties. At the other end of the scale is the New Democratic Party. The NDP caucus contains no member who should be designated to another party. At the same time the average probability of an NDP member belonging to that party is a remarkable 99.4%. On both measures the Progressive Conservative Party finds itself in the centre. The mean probability of a Conservative M.L.A. belonging to that party on the basis of attitudes is 81.1%.

Also 10% of the Progressive Conservative caucus hold attitudes more in common with another party.¹

The breakdown in seats at the time this study was conducted was Progressive Conservatives seventy-six, Liberals twenty-two, and New Democrats nineteen. Therefore at least part of the hypothesis is borne out. The smallest caucus is the most cohesive. However the largest parliamentary group is more cohesive than the Liberal Party. While the Liberal caucus is slightly larger than that of the NDP and less than a third of the Progressive Conservative caucus, the Liberal Party is the most diverse ideologically. Thus it would appear that the Progressive Conservatives have been able to forge a political coalition which avoids many of the diverse, marginal interests in the province. In short, the Progressive Conservatives have a coalition which represents "average" Ontario.

In exploring the possibility of coalitions, it is interesting to note the results of Figure I. Ideological cohesion parallels demographic cohesion. Except for the percentage of a riding that is urban, the New Democrats exhibit less variation on the demographic features than either of the other parties. On all four demographic

¹16.7% of the Liberal caucus were misclassified on the basis of ideological variables. Liberal members have a 77.8% probability of belonging to that caucus.

indicators the Liberal Party showed the greatest variation. The amount of diversity in the Progressive Conservative caucus was once again between the two extremes. This parallel relationship between ideological and demographic cohesion may further substantiate the presence of a causal relationship between constituency features and the attitudes of the legislator representing that constituency. Therefore the finding severely questions--or at least proves an exception to--the traditional assumption that the winning party represents the most interests and as a consequence is the most factional.¹ However the results show that the party that represents the greatest amount of interests is the most diverse ideologically but that there is no a priori reason for this party to be the victorious one.

Hypothesis IV:

The importance of demographic features of constituencies has already been established in the first three hypotheses. Consequently the contention contained in hypothesis four flows naturally from the previous findings. Members representing constituencies atypical

¹The traditional belief may be more valid in a two-party system. Since Ontario is a one-party dominant multi-party system the validity of the assumption in a two-party system is beyond the scope of this study.

of the party do in fact have ideological beliefs distinct from the rest of the party. This belief is substantiated in two ways. Table VIII takes the ideological divisions within the parties and compares the values for the demographic features. Table X approaches the problem in the reverse. Table X establishes which members should not, on the basis of constituency variables, be members of that party. Then the factor scores on the three most important factors are compared. No matter which approach is adopted the results support the hypothesis.¹

The differences in the demographic features as outlined in Table VIII are generally significant. At the .05 level of significance Tory Liberals are distinct from Socialist Liberals on all four indicators. Whig Liberals are significantly different from Tory Liberals in every area except percentage of Roman Catholics. By the same token, Whig Liberals differ from Socialist Liberals on the variables measuring the percentage of industrial workers and Roman Catholics. In the Progressive Conservative Party Tories differ from Whigs only on the

¹Even though the differences in factor scores as outlined in Table X are significant there are no patterns between parties and as a result the method outlined for Table VIII would be preferable. It must be recognized that the two procedures are not entirely interchangeable. Under the procedure being used for Table X four New Democrats are misclassified while Table VIII classifies no New Democrats outside the Socialist bloc.

basis of the percentage of Roman Catholics (at the .05 level of significance). When the level of significance is changed to .10 the blocs are significantly different on the percentage of farmers and Roman Catholics.

Since the greatest proportion of Liberals are Whigs and Progressive Conservatives are Tories, those members who do not fit the majority ideology should come from constituencies which are also atypical. This result seems to be borne out by Tables VIII and X.

Hypothesis V:

Hypothesis V posits the belief that the more atypical a constituency is from the party norm the more likely that member is to be facing stiff electoral pressure. Hypothesis V relates the electoral margin to deviation in party ideology through the link of constituency features. This hypothesis is also concerned with those legislators who, while representing typical constituencies, have an ideology more closely associated with another party. This deviation from the party line would be reflected in a reduced electoral margin.

This hypothesis is tested by the computation of a Pearson correlation coefficient. In fact, six coefficients must be calculated--two for each party. The correlation

coefficient will measure the degree of association between the legislator's perceived safety of his seat and factor scores.

The hypothesis explicitly states that a legislator who is in close contention with another party is more sympathetic to the beliefs of that party. Therefore the respondents must be divided into groups on the basis of which party placed second in the constituency. Since an ideology is associated with each party, the coefficient will measure the degree of association between seat security and sympathy towards the relevant party ideology. To prove the hypothesis, a negative co-efficient must be present which would signify that the more insecure the seat the more sympathetic the legislator is to the party that placed second.¹

Four of the six cases substantiate the hypothesis.²

¹It should be noted that a member can be more sympathetic to the beliefs of another party and still be as partisan as, if not more partisan than, other party members. Such a situation is outlined in Table X where Progressive Conservatives representing NDP-like constituencies are more sympathetic to Socialist beliefs but at the same time have the highest pro-Tory scores.

²The following are the Pearson correlation coefficients relating safeness of the seat and factor scores on the ideological factors associated with the party that placed second in the constituency.

In constituencies that had Liberals or New Democrats running second to the winning candidate, a negative correlation was found between seat security and sympathy to the ideology of the party running second in the constituency. It is interesting to note that Liberals and New Democrats who beat Progressive Conservative candidates had a slight, though not significant, positive correlation between their estimate of seat security and their score on the Tory factor. This slight positive value would indicate that the more successful Liberals and New Democrats are slightly more tolerant of the Tory philosophy than less successful legislators. Such a tolerance may be part of an effort to broaden electoral appeal.¹

Winning Party	Second Party	Coefficient	Factor
PC	LIB	-.3098	Whig
NDP	LIB	-.6840	Whig
PC	NDP	-.2836	Socialist
LIB	NDP	-.7975	Socialist
LIB	PC	+.1351	Tory
NDP	PC	+.0798	Tory

¹Another reason that Liberals facing PC opposition may have slightly positive coefficients is that Liberal representing constituencies atypical of that party hold seats safer than typical party members. In four of the party's five atypical constituencies the Progressive Conservatives placed second. It is the affinity between the Tory philosophy and these members that may cause much of the positive relationship. If only typical ridings are used a negative relationship is found.

Generally a relationship exists between electoral margin and the willingness of a legislator to accept the views of another party. The relationship is not perfect but with four of the six cases fitting the requirements (and a fifth bordering on the requirements) the weight of the data is on the side of substantiating the hypothesis.

Hypothesis VI:

The object of this hypothesis is to isolate from hypothesis five the influence of legislators who represent constituencies similar to the party average but who chose to deviate from the party ideological norm. Before, hypothesis VI can be tested, the typical party constituency must be identified. For the purposes of this study a typical constituency is classified as similar to the party on the basis of the discriminant analysis results.¹

Hypothesis VI will be tested in a manner similar to the procedure used in hypothesis V. However in this instance interest is focused on a legislator's attitudes towards the three major factors and not just the factor associated with the second-placing party. Electoral success is once again represented by the variable estimating the electoral security of the seat. To prove this

¹See Table IX for the actual breakdown of constituencies.

hypothesis, a positive correlation should be produced on the factor score associated with the particular party and a negative coefficient on the other two scores.


In constituencies which are atypical, a reverse pattern would be expected. A low plurality in an atypical constituency would be brought about by a legislator's strict adherence to the party line. In an atypical riding a politician would enhance his electoral chances by deviating from the party's ideological position.

Conceptually this hypothesis, and its corollary, are represented in Figure III (b). This approach contradicts the traditional view taken by Thomas A. Flinn. The Flinn model is presented in Figure III (a) and it sets forth the belief that in a typical constituency a low plurality results from a low degree of loyalty to the party. Conversely the Flinn model maintains that in typical constituencies high pluralities result from lower levels of loyalty to the party. Therefore the relationship as hypothesized in this study stands at total odds with the theory advanced by many writers.


Correlation coefficients were produced for members representing typical and atypical ridings on the three most important factors. This procedure gave a total of eighteen coefficients. When the coefficients are matched

FIGURE III

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY LOYALTY AND CONSTITUENCY FACTORS



Adopted from Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," American Political Science Review, LVII (1964), p. 68.



Hypothesized relationship between electoral margin, constituency features and party loyalty.

for party members representing typical and atypical ridings there are nine pairs of coefficients. Of these nine pairs seven of them contain coefficients with different signs. In an eighth pair the coefficient drops from a value of .95 for atypical ridings to .15 for typical ridings. As a result the hypotheses and illustration represented by Figure III (b) are proved. In constituencies typical of the party, electoral success is enhanced by adherence to the party philosophy while in atypical ridings electoral security is obtained through deviation from the party norm.¹

¹The nine pairs of coefficients are presented below.

Party	Class	Tory Factor	Whig Factor	Socialist Factor
PC	typical	.29	-.07	.23
PC	atypical	-.40	-.06	-.37
LIB	typical	-.24	.36	.30
LIB	atypical	.26	-.72	-.33
NDP	typical	-.14	.15	-.65
NDP	atypical	.95	.95	.15

Only the Progressive Conservatives on the Whig Factor and the New Democrats on the Whig Factor go against the trend. On the three most important pairs (the Conservatives on the Tory factor, Liberals on the Whig and New Democrats on the Socialist) opposite signs are found for typical and atypical groups. These pairs are the most important since they relate the dominant party ideology to seat security for typical and atypical ridings.

However it will be noted that in the case of the NDP on the Socialist Factor the negative coefficient is associated with typical constituencies and not atypical ridings as

Hypothesis VII:

A member's ideology may be influenced by more than the demographic character of his constituency. His attitudes may be influenced by the roles of his party and its leadership in his political career. Hypothesis VII argues that the greater the role of a party in recruiting an individual as a candidate for the legislature, the greater the likelihood the legislator would accept party views.

Pearson correlation coefficients test the relationship between party influence on a legislator's nomination and the factor scores. No significant relationship exists for members of any of the parties on the three major factors between the degree of party influence and the factor scores. It must be concluded that the data does not support the hypothesis.¹

might be expected. Since all New Democrats are classed as Socialist the party norm is represented by moderation on the Socialist Factor. Thus in typical ridings NDPers with low pluralities would tend to be extreme Socialists. In constituencies typical of the NDP, electoral success is brought about by moderation. As a result the problem with the NDP is that deviants exceed the party norm rather than fall short of the norm, which is the case with the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties. Regardless of what causes the negative co-efficient for New Democrats from typical ridings the fact remains that the coefficient for NDPers from atypical constituencies is positive.

¹The correlation coefficients for the factor scores and the nomination variable are as follows:

Hypothesis VIII:

This hypothesis assumes that legislators perceive potential conflict between constituency and party interests. It would therefore be natural for members whose attitudes differ from the party to justify their views by emphasizing their loyalty to constituency interests. Therefore the greater the deviation from the party norm, the greater the loyalty to the constituency.

In order to measure the relationship, respondents were asked the following question: "If a majority of your constituents were strongly opposed to your party's stand, but you had no strong views, how committed would you be to your party's position?" Respondents were asked to give the response on a seven point scale. A score of one meant the legislator would be very committed to the party while a response of seven would indicate no commitment to the party whatsoever. The direction of the coefficient is just as important as the magnitude. A positive co-

Party	Tory Factor	Whig Factor	Socialist Factor
PC	-.01	.10	-.01
LIB	.25	-.21	-.28
NDP	.31	.05	.27

efficient indicates that the two variables (ie. the factor score and the degree of commitment to the party) vary in the same direction. A negative coefficient results from the one variable increasing in value while the other decreases.

Loyalty to the constituency does not vary significantly with the factor scores related to factor I. The score of factor two varies positively with constituency loyalty for members of the New Democratic Party. Therefore a member who had a relatively high factor score would also tend to have a high value on the seven point scale. As a result the less loyal a member is to the party line, the more likely he is to have a positive factor score for factor two. Thus, a positive coefficient indicates that the less the allegiance to the party, the less Socialist the individual is. Such a finding tends to substantiate the hypothesis as far as the NDP is concerned.

For the Whig Factor, the Liberal Party has a positive coefficient for the relationship with loyalty to the constituency. However, the overall pattern would only be complete if a positive coefficient existed for Progressive Conservatives on the Tory factor.

Since two of the parties do fit the pattern hypothesized, it can be concluded that the hypothesis is in fact valid.¹

Hypothesis IX:

Hypothesis IX extends further the concept that the member who deviates from the party ideology is isolated from the party. A significant relationship between the amount of influence a member feels he has in the party and the factor scores were found in two cases. First, the Liberals who felt influential tended to be pro-Tory in attitudes. By the same token, influential New Democrats tended to be more pro-Whig than ordinary NDPers. These are not the results that were to be expected. If the hypothesis was to be unquestionably proven a positive coefficient for the Tory factor score and the influence measure would have been necessary for the Progressive Conservatives. Similarly a positive coefficient for the Liberals on the Whig score and the

¹The correlation coefficients for the factor scores and the loyalty to constituency variable are as follows.

Party	Tory Factor	Whig Factor	Socialist Factor
PC	.18	.24	.07
LIB	-.01	.36	-.06
NDP	-.24	-.40	.44

New Democrats on the Socialist score should have been present if the view that party deviators consider themselves uninfluential was to be established.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis sought to study three aspects of the attitudes of Ontario legislators. First, efforts were made to isolate individual attitude structures or patterns. Second, the attitude patterns of members were aggregated and the ideological patterns between and within legislative groups were analyzed. Finally, attention was focused on the relationship between ideology and such external variables as constituency features. At this point it may be convenient to summarize the results of the research as the findings relate to these three purposes.

The attitudes of Ontario legislators were found to fit within three major classifications. For the purposes of this study these attitude patterns were labeled as Tory, Whig and Socialist. Each pattern had a number of attitudes that formed an integral part of the pattern and helped in the identification of the underlying dimension of the pattern. The Tory pattern was characterized by adherence to the values of rural-Protestant Ontario. As such, the Tory pattern required an acceptance of the British connection and established values and institutions within Ontario society. In the case of the Whig pattern, belief in the value of free enterprise or economic

liberalism seemed to be the dominant feature. As for the Socialist pattern, it was typified by an affiliation with the values, symbols and institutions of lower social classes. In addition the Socialist attitudinal pattern required acceptance of a positive role for government within society.

Upon further analysis of the data, it was established that the division of members, on the basis of the attitude pattern subscribed to, corresponded roughly to the make-up of the party caucuses. The Progressive Conservative caucus was dominated by legislators who held a Tory point of view. All New Democratic Party legislators were classed as Socialists. While no single attitude pattern was subscribed to by a majority of Liberal members, a marked leaning towards a Whig philosophy was evident. Thus it was obvious that the degree of ideological dispersion varied from party to party. The most ideologically cohesive party was the New Democratic Party followed by the Progressive Conservative Party.

A number of statistical tests were performed to establish the significance of the differences in the attitude patterns exhibited by the parties. The tests produced evidence that showed significant differences did exist between the attitude patterns of Ontario parties.

After the significance of differences in attitude patterns and levels of cohesion was established, attention was focused on variables that could help explain these differences. While the number of these variables was limited by the strictures of time, space and significance, relationships between constituency features and ideology were established. Important demographic features, such as differences in a constituency's class, religious and urban make-up, exerted pressures on legislators to hold attitudes that corresponded to the interests of the constituency. Thus a legislator representing a riding atypical of the party is pressured to deviate from the party's ideological position. This in turn has a direct effect on the degree of ideological cohesion exhibited by the parties. It was not surprising to find that the measures of dispersion on demographic variables paralleled the measures of partisan cohesion.

It must be noted that the existence of significant differences in the beliefs associated with each party is no guarantee that the policies advanced by the parties will reflect the party's ideological leaning. It may in fact be true that the average Progressive Conservative voter is ideologically not all that dissimilar from the average Liberal voter, a fact which forces the parties

to appeal to the electorate in very similar terms. But it does not follow that elected legislators who make up the core of the party are also more ideologically alike than different.

Heinz Eulau concluded in his study that what may be true of individuals may not be true of the aggregates of which individual persons are members.¹ This statement points to a problem that needs further study. Research is needed to prove whether the attitude pattern of a party is reflected in the policy programme that the party adopts.

In a similar vein further research is needed to discover what happens to the attitudes of party members when the party obtains power. Research in this area would help ~~answer~~ a number of questions. In particular this research would help solve the problem of whether socialists remain socialists upon the assumption of power. Some political scientists believe politicians are affected by the demands of governing and often desert previous ideological convictions once they are thrust into a decision-making role. Another related area of concern is the effect elevation to a cabinet or

¹Eulau, op. cit., p. 373.

executive position has on the beliefs of a government backbencher. As an executive member the legislator must accept collective responsibility for government actions, but as a backbencher his views were able to vary with greater freedom. Therefore the question arises whether the views of an executive member are isomorphic to those held when he was a government backbencher.

The interpretations given to the attitude patterns found in this research are not the only interpretations available. It is possible that the Tory, Whig and Socialist patterns could be re-analyzed using different evaluation criteria.¹ Similarly, additional variables could have been introduced in an effort to obtain more refined results. It would be naive to claim that the variables used in this study are the only variables to influence the structure of party solidarity. However, the variables used are clearly among the most important indicators when proving that the present political parties are cohesive as well as disciplined.

¹For an example of how these factors and patterns could be interpreted differently see Conrad Winn, "Spatial Models of Party Systems: An Examination of the Canadian Case," University of Pennsylvania Doctoral Dissertation, 1972. See also Conrad Winn and John McMenemy, "Political Alignment in a Polarized City: Electoral Cleavages in Kitchener, Ontario," Canadian Journal of Political Science (June, 1973).

APPENDIX I

SURVEY OF MEMBERS OF THE ONTARIO LEGISLATURE¹Variable²Part I: Background Information

The following questions deal with various characteristics of yourself, your party and your constituency.

- | | |
|----------|---|
| TENURE | 1. For approximately how many years have you been an MLA?
()2; ()5; ()10; ()15; ()20; ()25; ()30 |
| MEMBER | 2. For approximately how many years have you been a registered member of your party?
()Years |
| ACTIVE | 3. How active were you in the party organization before your election to the Legislature?
(Very Active)1 2 3 4 5 6 7(Not Active At All) |
| NOMINATN | 4. When you first considered seeking the nomination, to what extent did party officials encourage you to do so?
(Very Much) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Not At All) |
| SEAT | 5. How safe is your seat?
(Very Safe) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Not Safe At All) |
| SECOND | 6. In the 1971 election which party placed second in your constituency? _____. |
| THIRD | Third? _____. |

¹The questions are reproduced with the same wording, and in the same form, as they appeared on the questionnaire distributed to the Members of the Legislature. However, the amount of space allotted for answers has been reduced.

²Variable names correspond to the abbreviations used in the tables found throughout the body of the study. These names were not included on the original survey. The names have been added only to help the reader match the variable names with the actual question.

Variable

7. Approximately what percentage of your constituency is made up of:
- | | | |
|----------|---------------------|---------|
| URBAN | Urban Voters? | (%) |
| FARMERS | Farmers? | (%) |
| WORKERS | Industrial Workers? | (%) |
| CATHOLIC | Roman Catholics? | (%) |
- DISTANCE 8. How far is your constituency from Queen's Park in miles? ()Miles
- OCCUP 9. What was your occupation when you were first elected to the Legislature? _____
- CONROLE 10. In your view, how important should service to the constituency be for an MLA?
(Very Important)1234567(Not Important At All)
- CONLOYAL 11. If a majority of your constituents were strongly opposed to your party's stand, but you had no strong views, how committed would you be to your party's position?
(Very Committed)1234567(Not Committed At All)
- SETTING 12. In what type of setting did you spend most of the years during which you were growing up?
()Large City; ()Small City; ()Town;
()Rural
- BIRTH 13. In approximately what year were you born?
()1900 or before; ()1905; ()1910; ()1915;
()1920; ()1925; ()1930; ()1935; ()1940
or after
- YREDUCAT 14. How many years of formal education have you received? ()Years
- YRSERVE 15. Before you were elected to the Legislature, for how many years had you held other elected public offices? ()Years
- RELBACK 16. What is your religious background? _____
- CHURCH 17. Do you attend church?
(Very Often) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Not At All)
- INFLUENC 18. Not all MLA's are equally influential.
Compared to the leaders of your party on the one hand and new unproven MLA's on the other

Variable

how would you estimate your influence in
party affairs?

(Very Influential) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Not At All)

- LEADERS 19. How close do you feel to your party's leaders?
(Consistently
Very Close) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (Not Always Close)

Part II: Political Opinions

The following questions are intended to elicit
your opinions. After reading each statement,
please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree.
If you agree completely choose (1); if you disagree
completely choose (7); otherwise choose a number
in between. If you have no opinion on a question,
or prefer not to answer, indicate this by choosing
(9).

- FORCGRP 20. A major goal of government policy should be to
prevent the further takeover of the Canadian
economy by foreign corporations.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- IMMIGRTN 21. Our country should control the immigration of
certain racial and religious groups.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- ABORTION 22. Abortion is a decision to be made by the
individual alone.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- SEPARATE 23. The Ontario Government should finance the
Separate Catholic School System on an equal
footing with the public system.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- AUTO 24. A government operated auto insurance plan is
what Ontario needs today.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- GOVTROLE 25. It should be a major purpose of government to
reduce the gap between the very rich and the
very poor.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9

Variable

- FREEENTE 26. The strength of this country today is largely a product of the free enterprise system.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- TRADITIN 27. Traditions serve a useful social purpose by providing stability and continuity.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- WELFARE 28. Though it may be true that public welfare programmes are sometimes inefficient the main problem is that not enough money is spent on welfare.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- FEDERAL 29. The federal government has too much power when compared with provincial and local governments.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- NATIONAL 30. In terms of present economic conditions, the nationalization of some industries would be appropriate and effective.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- POLICE 31. While the police should not violate the rights of the individual their surveillance of dangerous groups like the Neo-Nazis and John Birchers is needed.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9
- CENSOR 32. Except in time of war, censorship in any form cannot be justified.
(Completely Agree)1234567(Completely Disagree) 9

Part III: Feelings Towards Various Groups

The following is a list of people, organizations, and countries. Using a seven point scale, please indicate your feelings about each. The (1) will symbolize a completely favourable attitude while (7) will stand for an unfavourable one. Once again (9) will indicate no opinion.

		Positive Feelings					Neutral			Negative Feelings		
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9			
FACTORY	33. Factory Workers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9			
FARMER	34. Farmers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9			

<u>Variable</u>									
UNDERDEV	35. Underdeveloped Nations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
LIONS	36. The Lions Club	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
ANGLICAN	37. Anglicans	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
CIC	38. Committee for an Independent Canada	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
PROFESSO	39. University Professors	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
ORANGE	40. Orange Lodge	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
BRITAIN	41. Great Britain	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
JEWS	42. Jews	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
NVIETNAM	43. North Viet-Nam	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
CORPEXEC	44. Corporation Executives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
FRCDNS	45. French Canadians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
USTATES	46. United States	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
EMPIRE	47. Empire Club	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
ACTION	48. Community Action Groups	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
WOMENS	49. Women's Liberation	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
UNION	50. Trade Union Leaders	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
MONARCHY	51. The Monarchy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
CMA	52. Canadian Manufacturers Association	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
POLLUTIN	53. Pollution Probe	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
DEVELOPE	54. Land Developers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
OMA	55. Ontario Medical Association	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
WELFRE	56. People on Welfare	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9

APPENDIX II

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR IDEOLOGICAL VARIABLES¹

	F O R C O R P	I M M I G R T N	A B O R T I O N	S E P A R A T E	A U T O	G O V T R O L E	F R E E E N T E	T R A D I T I N	W E L F A R E	F E D E R A L	N A T I O N A L	P O L I C E	C E N S O R
FORCORP		-.08	.08	.24	.28	.38	-.21	-.24	.36	.04	.24	-.18	.25
IMMIGRTN	-.08		.13	-.37	-.17	-.03	.49	.30	-.28	.23	-.29	.43	.09
ABORTION	.08	.13		-.03	.15	.23	-.02	.02	-.05	.24	.15	-.13	.34
SEPARATE	.24	-.37	-.03		.59	.45	-.40	-.28	.31	-.35	.49	-.23	-.01
AUTO	.28	-.17	.15	.59		.51	-.63	-.35	.47	-.10	.71	-.25	.05
GOVTROLE	.38	-.03	.23	.45	.51		-.39	-.17	.30	-.21	.47	-.22	.15
FREEENTE	-.21	.49	-.02	-.40	-.63	-.39		.48	-.52	.20	-.65	.36	-.14
TRADITIN	-.24	.30	.02	-.28	-.35	-.17	.48		-.26	.24	-.40	.12	-.16
WELFARE	.36	-.28	-.05	.31	.47	.30	-.52	-.26		-.06	.56	-.27	-.08
FEDERAL	.04	.23	.24	-.35	-.10	-.21	.20	.24	-.06		-.23	.28	-.04
NATIONAL	.24	-.29	.15	.49	.71	.47	-.65	-.40	.56	-.23		-.26	.10

	F O R C O R P	I M M I G R A T I O N	A B O R T I O N	S E P A R A T E	A U T O	G O V T R O L E	F R E E E N T E	T R A D I T I O N	W E L F A R E	F E D E R A L	N A T I O N A	P O L I C E	C E N S O R
POLICE	-.18	.43	-.13	-.23	-.25	-.22	.36	.12	-.27	.28	-.26		-.14
CENSOR	.25	.09	.34	-.01	.05	.15	-.14	-.16	-.08	-.04	.10	-.14	
FACTORY	.14	-.20	-.13	.08	.21	.24	-.14	.05	.23	-.02	.14	-.23	-.02
FARMER	-.08	-.02	-.13	-.28	-.40	-.21	.32	.20	-.15	.16	-.26	.13	-.05
UNDERDEV	.24	-.18	-.19	.14	.19	.09	-.35	-.15	.36	.02	.23	-.10	-.04
LIONS	-.10	.23	-.17	-.32	-.42	-.13	.46	.32	-.23	.11	-.46	.24	-.12
ANGLICAN	.10	.00	-.09	-.23	-.20	-.04	.18	.43	-.07	.12	-.21	.05	-.07
CIC	.27	-.12	-.45	.23	.06	.28	-.09	-.06	.04	-.09	-.05	-.11	-.07
PROFESSOR	.11	-.31	-.31	.11	.23	.23	-.38	-.20	.24	-.07	.22	-.15	.00
ORANGE	-.23	.24	-.09	-.17	-.32	-.04	.27	.28	-.03	.18	-.25	.32	-.19
BRITAIN	.02	.14	-.09	-.33	-.18	.10	.15	.33	-.04	.21	-.16	.09	.15
JEWS	.00	-.32	-.32	.16	.04	.12	-.08	.11	.15	-.07	-.02	-.19	.04
NVIETNAM	.22	-.30	-.01	.45	.40	.32	-.52	-.31	.44	-.15	.52	-.27	.18

	F O R C O R P	I M M I G R A T I O N	A B O R T I O N	S E P A R A T E	A U T O	G O V T R O L E	F R E E E N T E	T R A D I T I O N	W E L F A R E	F E D E R A L	N A T I O N A L	P O L I C E	C E N S O R
CORPEXEC	-.36	.29	-.17	-.35	-.48	-.28	.60	.50	-.28	.07	-.49	.12	-.26
FRCDNS	.09	-.37	-.20	.11	-.09	.00	-.04	-.03	.28	-.04	.02	-.08	.06
USTATES	-.30	.18	.13	-.25	-.29	-.10	.35	.33	-.07	.02	-.20	.09	-.27
EMPIRE	-.27	.33	-.17	-.46	-.63	-.34	-.63	.41	-.32	.32	-.59	.43	-.17
ACTION	.33	-.22	-.11	.28	.27	.28	-.23	-.17	.31	.01	.12	-.10	-.08
WOMENS	.29	-.24	.02	.25	.37	.35	-.48	-.24	.41	.04	.38	-.38	.15
UNION	.28	-.37	-.13	.22	.38	.36	-.44	-.16	.43	-.02	.40	-.20	-.17
MONARCHY	-.16	.16	-.08	-.42	-.29	-.08	.41	.44	-.23	.30	-.36	.27	-.09
CMA	-.20	.33	-.21	-.46	-.67	-.34	.74	.57	-.29	.24	-.62	.27	-.30
POLLUTIN	.20	-.08	-.18	.15	.21	.21	-.19	-.03	.30	-.22	.29	-.14	.06
DEVELOPE	-.22	.02	-.25	-.18	-.41	-.18	.34	.24	-.14	.05	-.48	.15	-.37
OMA	.04	.05	-.24	-.25	-.41	-.25	.41	.17	-.07	.11	-.36	.30	-.27
WELFRE	.13	-.24	-.08	.08	.09	.32	-.37	-.19	.40	-.05	.27	-.16	.16

	F A C T O R Y	F A R M E R	U N D E R D E V	L I O N S	A N G L I C A N	C I C	P R O F E S S O	O R A N G E	B R I T A I N	J E W S	N V I E T N A M	C O R P E X E C
FORCORP	.14	-.08	.24	-.10	.10	.27	.11	-.23	.02	.00	.22	-.36
IMMIGRTN	-.20	-.02	-.18	.23	.00	-.12	-.31	.24	.14	-.32	-.30	.29
ABORTION	-.13	-.13	-.19	-.17	-.09	-.45	-.31	-.09	-.09	-.32	-.01	-.17
SEPARATE	.08	-.28	.14	-.32	-.23	.23	.11	-.17	-.33	.16	.45	-.35
AUTO	.21	-.40	.19	-.42	-.20	.06	.23	-.32	-.18	.04	.40	-.48
GOVTROLE	.24	-.21	.09	-.13	-.04	.28	.23	-.04	.10	.12	.32	-.28
FREEENTE	-.14	.32	-.35	.46	.18	-.09	-.38	.27	.15	-.08	-.52	.60
TRADITIN	.05	.20	-.15	.32	.43	-.06	-.20	.28	.33	.11	-.31	.50
WELFARE	.23	-.15	.36	-.23	-.07	.04	.24	-.03	-.04	.15	.44	-.28
FEDERAL	-.02	.16	.02	.11	.12	-.09	-.07	.18	.21	-.07	-.15	.07
NATIONAL	.14	-.26	.23	-.46	-.21	-.05	.22	-.25	-.16	-.02	.52	-.49

	F A C T O R Y	F A R M E R	U N D E R D E V	L I O N S	A N G L I C A N	C I C	P R O F E S S O	O R A N G E	B R I T A I N	J E W S	N V I E T N A M	C O R P E X E C
POLICE	-.23	.13	-.10	.24	.05	-.11	-.15	.32	.09	-.19	-.27	.12
CENSOR	-.02	-.05	-.04	-.12	-.07	-.07	.00	-.19	.15	.04	.18	-.26
FACTORY		.17	.50	.14	.37	.37	.37	.16	.37	.48	.44	.01
FARMER	.17		.22	.46	.55	.20	.06	.36	.45	.27	-.07	.37
UNDERDEV	.50	.22		.19	.35	.31	.27	.12	.27	.31	.50	-.19
LIONS	.14	.46	.19		.66	.24	-.05	.37	.39	.29	-.17	.43
ANGLICAN	.37	.55	.35	.66		.41	.22	.32	.54	.45	.06	.26
CIC	.37	.20	.31	.24	.41		.43	.09	.19	.45	.26	-.09
PROFESSO	.37	.06	.27	-.05	.22	.43		.07	.18	.35	.39	-.03
ORANGE	.16	.36	.12	.37	.32	.09	.07		.34	.21	-.02	.44
BRITAIN	.37	.45	.27	.39	.54	.19	.18	.34		.32	.00	.34
JEWS	.48	.27	.31	.29	.45	.45	.35	.21	.32		.18	.23
NVIETNAM	.44	-.07	.50	-.17	.06	.26	.39	-.02	.00	.18		-.24

	F A C T O R Y	F A R M E R	U N D E R D E V	L I O N S	A N G L I C A N	C I C	P R O F E S S O	O R A N G E	B R I T A I N	J E W S	N V I E T N A N	C O R P E X E C
CORPEXEC	.01	.37	-.19	.43	.26	-.09	-.03	.44	.34	.23	-.24	
FRCDNS	.34	.28	.30	.31	.38	.37	.35	.22	.19	.65	.30	.14
USTATES	.05	.31	-.06	.36	.26	-.24	-.06	.46	.20	.06	-.06	.69
EMPIRE	.12	.51	.02	.73	.37	.08	-.04	.56	.40	.16	-.30	.71
ACTION	.55	.13	.49	.15	.27	.51	.39	.17	.10	.27	.45	-.17
WOMENS	.45	-.02	.38	-.14	.07	.31	.38	.02	.08	.13	.57	-.25
UNION	.49	-.09	.22	-.25	.10	.37	.54	.04	.03	.26	.44	-.26
MONARCHY	.13	.50	-.03	.52	.48	.14	.06	.43	.63	.19	-.35	.44
CMA	-.02	.48	-.23	.55	.34	-.02	-.20	.35	.39	.06	-.42	.73
POLLUTIN	.44	.10	.38	.09	.25	.38	.38	.04	.21	.30	.32	-.08
DEVELOPE	.03	.27	.06	.37	.17	.00	.06	.37	.08	.19	-.04	.61
OMA	.06	.48	.20	.35	.33	-.02	.00	.35	.32	.15	-.23	.55
WELFRE	.53	.16	.54	-.03	.17	.22	.41	.23	.33	.30	.51	-.15

	F R C D N S	U S T A T E S	E M P I R E	A C T I O N	W O M E N S	U N I O N	M O N A R C H Y	C M A	P O L L U T I N	D E V E L O P E	O M A	W E L F R E
FORCORP	.09	-.30	-.27	.33	.29	.28	-.16	-.20	.20	-.22	.04	.13
IMMIGRTN	-.37	.18	.33	-.22	-.24	-.37	.16	.33	-.08	.02	.05	-.24
ABORTION	-.20	.13	-.17	-.11	.02	-.13	-.08	-.21	-.18	-.25	-.24	-.08
SEPARATE	.11	-.25	-.46	.28	.25	.22	-.42	-.46	.15	-.18	-.25	.08
AUTO	-.09	-.29	-.63	.27	.38	.38	-.29	-.67	.21	-.41	-.41	.09
GOVTROLE	.06	-.10	-.34	.28	.35	.36	-.08	-.34	.21	-.18	-.25	.32
FREEENTE	-.04	.35	-.63	-.23	-.48	-.44	.41	.74	-.19	.34	.41	-.37
TRADITIN	-.03	.33	.41	-.17	-.24	-.16	.44	.57	-.03	.24	.17	-.19
WELFARE	.28	-.07	-.32	.31	.41	.43	-.23	-.29	.30	-.14	-.07	.40
FEDERAL	-.04	.02	.32	.01	.04	-.02	.30	.24	-.22	.05	.11	-.05
NATIONAL	.02	-.20	-.59	.12	.38	.40	-.36	-.62	.29	-.48	-.36	.27

	F R C D N S	U S T A T E S	E M P I R E	A C T I O N	W O M E N S	U N I O N	M O N A R C H Y	C M A	P O L L U T I O N	D E V E L O P E	O M A	W E L F R E
POLICE	-.08	.09	.43	-.10	-.38	-.20	.27	.27	-.14	.15	.30	-.16
CENSOR	.06	-.27	-.17	-.08	.15	-.17	-.09	-.30	.06	-.37	-.27	.16
FACTORY	.34	.05	.12	.55	.45	.49	.13	-.02	.44	.03	.06	.53
FARMER	.28	.31	.51	.13	-.02	-.09	.50	.48	.10	.27	.48	.16
UNDERDEV	.30	-.06	.02	.49	.38	.22	-.03	-.23	.38	.06	.20	.54
LIONS	.31	.36	.73	.15	-.14	-.25	.52	.55	.09	.37	.35	-.03
ANGLICAN	.38	.26	.37	.27	.07	.10	.48	.34	.25	.17	.33	.17
CIC	.37	-.24	.08	.51	.31	.37	.14	-.02	.38	.00	-.02	.22
PROFESSOR	.35	-.06	-.04	.39	.38	.54	.06	-.20	.38	.06	.00	.41
ORANGE	.22	.46	.56	.17	.02	.04	.43	.35	.04	.37	.35	.23
BRITAIN	.19	.20	.40	.10	.08	.03	.63	.39	.21	.08	.32	.33
JEWS	.65	.06	.16	.27	.13	.26	.19	.06	.30	.19	.15	.30
NVIETNAM	.30	-.06	-.30	.45	.57	.44	-.35	-.42	.32	-.04	-.23	.51

	F R C D N S	U S T A T E S	E M P I R E	A C T I O N	W O M E N S	U N I O N	M O N A R C H Y	C M A	P O L L U T I N	D E V E L O P E	O M A	W E L F R E
CORPEXEC	.14	.69	.71	-.17	-.25	-.26	.44	.73	-.08	.61	.55	-.15
FRCDNS		.20	.25	.43	.18	.23	.16	.04	.25	.18	.19	.29
USTATES	.20		.51	.01	-.12	-.23	.34	.49	-.17	.44	.35	.01
EMPIRE	.25	.51		.00	-.24	-.26	.65	.79	-.12	.55	.51	.03
ACTION	.43	.01	.00		.63	.45	.02	-.18	.52	.00	-.08	.26
WOMENS	.18	-.12	-.24	.63		.54	-.17	-.26	.42	-.16	-.12	.37
UNION	.23	-.23	-.26	.45	.54		-.13	-.26	.49	-.06	.00	.46
MONARCHY	.16	.34	.65	.02	-.17	-.13		.58	-.09	.23	.31	.03
CMA	.04	.49	.79	-.18	-.26	-.26	.58		-.12	.53	.57	-.13
POLLUTIN	.25	-.17	-.12	.52	.42	.49	-.09	-.12		-.19	.03	.22
DEVELOPE	.18	.44	.55	.00	-.16	-.06	.23	.53	-.19		.50	-.03
OMA	.19	.35	.51	-.08	-.12	.00	.31	.57	.03	.50		.14
WELFRE	.29	.01	.03	.26	.37	.46	.03	-.13	.22	-.03	.14	

¹The correlation coefficients were taken from the correlation matrix produced in conjunction with the factor analysis programme. The coefficients were based on the full sixty-four cases. In computing the coefficients pairwise deletion of missing data was used. For an explanation of the effects of pairwise deletion see Norman H. Nie, Dale H. Dent, and C. Hadlai Hull, SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw - Hill, 1970), p. 236.

APPENDIX III
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR FACTOR SCORES
AND VARIABLES BY PARTY AND BLOC

VARIABLE	<u>Tory Factor</u>					
	PC	LIB	NDP	TORY	WHIG	SOC.
Tenure	.12	-.28	.20	-.10	<u>.34</u>	<u>.42</u>
Member	-.03	.14	.16	-.27	.11	<u>.57</u>
Active	-.31	-.18	-.27	-.15	.01	-.16
Nominatn	-.01	.25	.31	-.21	-.03	<u>.59</u>
Seat	-.13	-.18	<u>.34</u>	-.14	.03	<u>.52</u>
Urban	-.16	.15	<u>.57</u>	-.10	-.29	-.18
Farmers	.18	-.05	<u>-.69</u>	.03	<u>.52</u>	-.19
Workers	-.20	.00	-.16	-.01	-.25	<u>-.47</u>
Catholic	.25	-.23	.13	.12	.11	<u>-.35</u>
Distance	<u>.33</u>	.28	-.11	.19	<u>.55</u>	<u>.34</u>
Conrole	.31	<u>.87</u>	.17	.25	<u>.57</u>	-.17
Conloyal	.18	-.01	-.24	-.26	<u>.57</u>	-.19
Birth	-.24	<u>.33</u>	-.20	-.03	<u>-.40</u>	<u>.56</u>
Yreducat	-.15	<u>.43</u>	.05	-.11	-.11	<u>.44</u>
Yrserve	.06	-.24	.02	-.11	.03	.10
Influenc	.28	<u>.40</u>	.29	.24	<u>.37</u>	<u>.64</u>
Leaders	.15	<u>-.34</u>	.24	.14	-.24	<u>.57</u>
Blishen	-.17	.02	<u>-.04</u>	-.21	-.26	<u>.42</u>

Socialist Factor

VARIABLE	PC	LIB	NDP	TORY	WHIG	SOC.
Tenure	<u>.34</u>	-.19	-.04	.23	.23	.05
Member	.23	.32	-.13	.14	<u>.39</u>	.12
Active	<u>-.44</u>	.03	<u>.59</u>	.00	<u>-.55</u>	<u>.52</u>
Nominatn	-.01	-.28	.27	-.17	.22	.26
Seat	-.28	<u>-.33</u>	<u>-.43</u>	-.27	<u>-.41</u>	-.20
Urban	-.11	-.31	.16	-.14	-.04	.12
Farmers	.20	<u>.49</u>	-.09	.24	.18	.09
Workers	-.31	<u>-.49</u>	<u>-.44</u>	-.12	<u>-.42</u>	<u>-.35</u>
Catholic	.05	.13	-.16	-.01	-.16	-.18
Distance	.17	.10	.05	.00	<u>.36</u>	-.03
Conrole	<u>.35</u>	.32	.07	<u>.39</u>	<u>.42</u>	.00
Conloyal	.07	-.06	<u>.44</u>	<u>-.35</u>	.17	<u>.42</u>
Birth	-.24	-.04	-.21	-.21	-.03	-.10
Yreducat	-.13	.04	-.18	-.01	-.03	-.11
Yreserve	-.02	.26	-.02	-.32	<u>.33</u>	.09
Influenc	.19	.02	-.21	.30	.18	-.20
Leaders	.01	<u>-.44</u>	<u>.56</u>	.15	-.24	<u>.39</u>
Blishen	-.04	<u>-.44</u>	-.15	.01	-.11	-.04

Whig Factor

Tenure	.13	.12	-.08	.02	.26	.22
Member	-.06	.20	-.03	-.23	.09	.04
Active	<u>-.47</u>	<u>-.46</u>	-.22	-.25	-.25	<u>-.48</u>

VARIABLE	PC	LIB	NDP	TORY	WHIG	SOC.
Nominatn	.10	-.21	.05	-.01	.17	-.22
Seat	-.20	-.14	<u>.46</u>	-.02	-.08	-.01
Urban	-.23	<u>-.43</u>	.21	-.17	<u>-.39</u>	.13
Farmers	.15	.30	<u>-.73</u>	.06	<u>.36</u>	<u>-.48</u>
Workers	-.27	<u>-.61</u>	-.09	-.13	<u>-.48</u>	-.22
Catholic	-.12	.32	<u>.49</u>	.20	-.07	.24
Distance	.19	.30	.20	.03	<u>.55</u>	.31
Conrole	.16	<u>.43</u>	.13	.10	<u>.39</u>	.12
Conloyal	.24	<u>.36</u>	<u>-.40</u>	-.01	<u>.45</u>	.31
Birth	-.04	.26	.06	-.04	-.15	-.04
Yreducat	.03	.26	<u>.37</u>	.01	.23	<u>.34</u>
Yreserve	-.02	-.12	.10	.14	-.15	-.17
Influenc	.27	-.18	<u>.33</u>	<u>.39</u>	.20	.19
Leaders	<u>.35</u>	<u>-.39</u>	.12	<u>.42</u>	-.05	.11
Blishen	-.17	<u>-.34</u>	.12	-.28	-.10	-.10

Cultural Liberalism Factor

Tenure	<u>.60</u>	<u>.34</u>	.16	<u>.48</u>	<u>.63</u>	-.01
Member	<u>.65</u>	.08	.22	<u>.60</u>	<u>.56</u>	.23
Active	.04	.06	.14	-.03	-.11	.02
Nominatn	-.07	-.14	.09	.11	.12	.02
Seat	.23	.05	-.15	.28	-.07	-.30
Urban	-.31	-.31	<u>.49</u>	-.36	-.04	<u>.51</u>
Farmers	<u>.41</u>	<u>.39</u>	<u>-.49</u>	.30	.27	<u>-.44</u>

VARIABLE	PC	LIB	NDP	TORY	WHIG	SOC.
Workers	.09	<u>-.33</u>	<u>-.33</u>	.17	-.11	-.20
Catholic	.20	.05	.19	.08	<u>.54</u>	.12
Distance	.18	<u>.41</u>	-.12	.05	<u>.60</u>	-.06
Conrole	.23	.32	.23	.27	.27	.26
Conloyal	.12	-.19	-.18	.12	-.13	-.26
Birth	<u>-.66</u>	-.24	-.31	<u>-.64</u>	<u>-.41</u>	-.27
Yreducat	-.10	-.28	.09	-.13	-.13	.17
Yrserve	.11	-.07	.07	.28	-.07	-.14
Influenc	.04	-.04	.00	-.01	<u>.36</u>	-.01
Leaders	-.06	.00	<u>.44</u>	-.01	.17	<u>.42</u>
Blisshen	-.17	<u>-.67</u>	.00	-.32	-.16	-.04

Collectivism Factor

Tenure	<u>.40</u>	.01	.04	<u>.45</u>	.16	-.09
Member	.26	<u>.47</u>	-.01	.27	<u>.39</u>	.22
Active	.06	.17	.08	<u>.46</u>	<u>-.60</u>	.04
Nominatn	.05	-.28	<u>.43</u>	-.12	.22	<u>.34</u>
Seat	-.21	.12	-.08	.02	<u>-.38</u>	-.29
Urban	<u>-.36</u>	.09	<u>.48</u>	<u>-.36</u>	.08	<u>.48</u>
Farmers	.30	.07	-.03	<u>.42</u>	-.23	-.20
Workers	<u>-.35</u>	.00	<u>.34</u>	.01	<u>-.57</u>	-.07
Catholic	-.05	-.53	-.25	.03	<u>-.40</u>	-.26
Distance	<u>.40</u>	.08	-.18	<u>.35</u>	<u>.36</u>	-.10

VARIABLE	PC	LIB	NDP	TORY	WHIG	SOC.
Conrole	.13	-.25	-.22	.02	-.03	-.22
Conloyal	.10	-.11	.03	-.04	.13	-.08
Birth	<u>-.40</u>	-.32	-.03	<u>-.46</u>	.05	-.11
Yreducat	-.14	-.10	-.16	-.30	.25	-.15
Yrserve	.10	<u>.62</u>	.02	.10	<u>.52</u>	-.14
Influenc	.12	<u>-.37</u>	-.02	.11	-.09	.01
Leaders	.10	-.31	.11	.09	-.16	.23
Blishen	-.24	-.04	-.10	-.25	.12	-.18

Statism Factor

Tenure	.05	.15	.18	-.02	.05	<u>.33</u>
Member	-.02	<u>-.77</u>	.32	.01	-.15	.16
Active	-.02	<u>.62</u>	-.12	-.06	.02	.15
Nominatn	.10	.01	.10	.26	.31	.17
Seat	-.19	-.26	.14	-.30	<u>-.43</u>	<u>.46</u>
Urban	.21	<u>-.68</u>	-.16	.23	-.06	-.19
Farmers	-.23	<u>.75</u>	.15	-.17	-.01	<u>.37</u>
Workers	-.06	-.11	-.11	-.01	-.08	-.17
Catholic	-.08	.13	-.26	.01	.00	-.01
Distance	-.07	<u>.44</u>	<u>.38</u>	.00	.00	.10
Conrole	.00	<u>.45</u>	<u>-.38</u>	.19	.14	-.23
Conloyal	.23	-.26	-.10	<u>.35</u>	<u>-.45</u>	.15
Birth	.14	.19	-.15	.17	<u>.35</u>	.01

VARIABLE	PC	LIB	NDP	TORY	WHIG	SOC.
Yreducat	.18	<u>-.37</u>	-.18	.31	-.18	-.17
Yrserve	.01	<u>-.73</u>	.14	-.05	<u>-.35</u>	<u>.36</u>
Influenc	.06	<u>.44</u>	.13	.11	.12	.08
Leaders	.00	.05	-.27	.07	.25	-.31
Blishen	<u>.45</u>	<u>-.50</u>	-.16	<u>.54</u>	-.11	.08

APPENDIX IV

MEAN POSITIONS OF PARTIES AND BLOCS FOR ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES

VARIABLE	PC		TORY		LIB		WHIG		NDP		SOC.		AVERAGE	
	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD
Forcorp	2.97	1.4	2.61	1.2	2.77	1.4	3.38	1.7	1.44	.7	1.55	.9	2.55	1.4
Immigrtn	3.61	2.2	3.23	2.3	4.62	2.1	4.67	2.1	5.40	2.2	5.32	2.1	4.29	2.3
Abortion	3.24	2.4	2.71	2.3	3.46	2.5	3.50	2.5	2.75	2.1	3.25	2.9	3.16	2.3
Separate	5.47	2.1	5.48	2.2	1.92	1.1	3.86	2.4	1.81	1.8	1.75	1.8	3.72	2.6
Auto	5.77	1.9	5.96	1.8	5.50	1.9	5.64	1.9	1.06	.3	1.85	.9	4.44	2.6
Govtrole	3.39	1.7	2.95	1.7	2.20	1.7	3.27	1.9	1.00	.0	1.15	.4	2.49	1.8
Freeente	1.77	1.0	1.61	1.1	2.62	1.7	2.06	1.1	5.56	1.7	5.25	1.6	2.89	2.1
Traditin	2.00	1.3	2.26	1.4	2.85	1.5	1.94	1.2	3.88	1.3	3.90	1.3	2.98	2.0
Welfare	5.77	1.5	6.14	1.4	5.23	1.7	4.86	1.6	3.25	1.9	3.65	2.2	4.98	2.0
Federal	2.39	1.8	2.76	2.4	5.83	1.2	3.56	2.1	4.14	2.1	4.44	2.2	3.51	2.2
National	6.06	1.4	5.91	1.6	4.92	1.8	6.19	1.2	1.94	1.1	2.35	1.9	4.73	2.3
Police	2.76	2.0	2.78	1.9	4.36	1.7	3.40	2.2	4.27	2.3	4.26	2.3	3.44	2.1

VARIABLE	PC		TORY		LIB		WHIG		NDP		SOC.		AVERAGE	
	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD
Censor	2.97	2.2	1.91	1.6	2.62	2.5	4.44	2.4	2.25	1.8	2.15	1.7	2.71	2.1
Factory	2.13	1.3	2.09	1.2	2.00	1.3	2.06	1.6	1.50	.8	1.50	.8	1.93	1.2
Farmer	1.69	1.0	1.30	.5	2.08	1.2	2.13	1.2	2.67	1.2	2.63	1.2	2.02	1.1
Underdev	3.18	1.9	3.25	1.8	2.58	2.1	2.64	2.1	2.00	.9	1.90	1.2	2.73	1.8
Lions	2.56	1.5	2.44	1.5	3.00	1.2	2.38	1.4	4.64	2.0	4.33	1.9	3.15	1.8
Anglican	2.13	1.4	1.86	1.2	3.00	1.1	2.67	1.5	2.87	1.8	3.00	2.1	2.51	1.5
CIC	4.38	2.2	4.04	2.2	3.69	1.9	4.56	2.0	3.80	2.0	3.47	1.8	4.08	2.1
Professo	4.10	1.7	4.55	1.8	4.77	1.4	4.07	1.7	2.88	1.3	2.95	1.4	3.92	1.7
Orange	4.67	1.9	5.00	2.1	5.08	1.8	4.56	2.0	5.86	1.5	5.17	2.0	5.05	1.8
Britain	2.06	1.8	1.78	1.0	3.15	1.3	2.88	1.5	2.67	1.2	2.79	1.3	2.45	1.3
Jews	2.71	1.4	2.67	1.3	2.33	1.4	2.56	1.5	2.50	1.2	2.33	1.1	2.58	1.3
NVietnam	5.42	1.5	5.47	1.4	4.11	2.0	5.15	1.9	3.43	1.7	3.44	1.7	4.65	1.8
Corpexec	2.97	1.4	3.14	1.4	3.50	1.1	2.88	1.4	5.47	1.3	5.11	1.6	3.72	1.7
FrCdns	2.38	1.4	2.52	1.7	2.50	2.0	2.44	1.5	2.36	1.5	2.11	1.3	2.40	1.5

VARIABLE	PC		TORY		LIB		WHIG		NDP		SOC.		AVERAGE	
	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD
UStates	2.84	1.5	3.04	1.6	2.91	1.4	2.27	1.1	4.13	1.3	4.05	1.3	3.19	1.5
Empire	2.79	1.4	2.79	1.4	3.91	.9	3.25	1.5	5.84	1.4	5.29	1.7	3.77	1.8
Action	3.88	1.9	4.04	1.9	3.46	2.1	3.44	2.2	2.27	1.2	2.32	1.2	3.38	1.9
Womens	5.38	1.5	5.26	1.7	4.75	2.2	5.50	1.6	3.33	1.8	3.33	1.8	4.73	1.9
Union	4.56	1.9	4.96	2.0	4.92	1.8	4.38	1.9	2.27	1.5	3.05	2.0	4.07	2.0
Monarchy	1.90	1.2	2.00	1.2	3.54	1.3	2.44	1.5	3.47	1.5	3.47	1.5	2.66	1.5
CMA	2.59	1.3	2.61	1.3	3.83	1.3	3.00	1.5	6.27	1.1	5.90	1.4	3.78	1.9
Pollutin	3.69	2.0	3.70	2.1	3.15	1.8	3.31	1.9	3.17	1.9	2.27	2.0	3.17	1.9
Develope	3.69	2.0	4.96	1.6	4.54	1.3	4.19	1.4	6.33	.7	5.84	1.4	5.02	1.5
OMA	3.66	1.6	3.70	1.5	4.53	1.1	4.00	1.7	5.43	1.7	5.17	1.9	4.27	1.7
Welfre	3.06	1.3	3.00	1.3	2.69	1.4	3.13	1.4	2.38	1.0	2.25	1.0	2.80	1.2

APPENDIX V

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGISLATORS BY PARTY AND BLOC

VARIABLE ¹	PC	TORY	LIB	WHIG	NDP	SOC.	OVERALL
Tenure	9.12	10.22	10.58	8.13	7.53	8.32	9.02
Member	19.97	19.30	15.58	18.56	17.27	17.05	18.36
Age	50.6	50.5	50.7	52.2	50.0	49.2	51.5
Yreducat	14.19	13.30	14.75	15.50	15.87	15.84	14.74
Yrserve	5.67	5.08	5.00	6.44	1.53	2.05	4.47
Blishen	58.19	55.85	59.78	60.02	57.94	60.23	58.45

¹All figures except Blishen are expressed in terms of years. For an explanation of the Blishen scale see Bernard R. Blishen et. al., Canadian Society: Sociological Perspectives, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 745 - 750. For the actual wording of the questions represented by these variables see Appendix I.

APPENDIX VI
PERCEPTIONS BY PARTY AND BLOC

VARIABLE ¹	PC	TORY	LIB	WHIG	NDP	LEFT	OVERALL
Active	2.61	2.78	4.50	3.56	2.07	2.37	2.82
Nominatn	3.26	2.65	2.00	3.12	2.60	2.79	2.83
Conrole	1.39	1.30	1.67	1.63	1.60	1.63	1.50
Conloyal	4.32	4.35	5.08	4.88	4.07	4.11	4.41
Influenc	3.23	3.04	3.33	3.50	3.53	3.53	3.33
Leaders	2.90	2.78	2.25	2.63	3.60	3.42	2.95

¹All figures are means representing positions on a seven point scale.
For the actual wording of the questions represented by these variables see
Appendix I.

APPENDIX VII
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PERCEPTIONS
OF BLOC MEMBERS BY PARTY

VARIABLE	TORY	PC WHIG	SOC.	TORY	LIBERAL WHIG	SOC.	TORY	NDP WHIG	SOC.
Tenure ¹	9.5	8.3	-	15.0	7.4	11.3	-	-	7.5
Member ¹	20.0	20.0	-	15.0	15.4	16.3	-	-	17.3
Age ¹	50.0	52.0	-	53.5	53.5	46.0	-	-	50.0
Yreducat ¹	13.6	15.0	-	11.3	16.0	15.8	-	-	15.9
Yrserve ¹	5.0	7.3	-	6.0	5.2	4.0	-	-	1.5
Blishen ²	57.0	59.0	-	48.9	59.1	68.8	-	-	57.9
Seat ³	3.3	4.5	-	5.7	5.4	5.5	-	-	3.9
Active ³	2.4	3.2	-	5.3	4.8	3.5	-	-	2.6
Nominatn ³	2.9	3.8	-	1.0	1.4	3.5	-	-	2.6
Conrole ³	1.4	1.2	-	1.0	2.0	1.8	-	-	1.6

VARIABLE	PC			LIBERAL			NDP		
	TORY	WHIG	SOC.	TORY	WHIG	SOC.	TORY	WHIG	SOC.
Conloyal ³	4.5	4.1	-	3.7	6.6	5.3	-	-	4.0
Influenc ³	3.1	3.7	-	3.0	3.4	3.5	-	-	3.5
Leaders ³	2.9	3.1	-	2.3	1.8	2.8	-	-	3.6

¹Expressed in terms of years.

²For an explanation of the Blishen scale see Bernard R. Blishen et. al., Canadian Society: Sociological Perspectives. 3rd ed., (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 745 - 750.

³All figures are means representing positions on a seven point scale. For the actual wording of the questions represented by these variables see Appendix I.

APPENDIX VIII
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS

Ideological Variables

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{PC} = & 7.523X_1 + 1.477X_2 + 1.217X_3 + 1.003X_4 + 4.195X_5 - \\
 & 1.887X_6 + 0.646X_7 + 4.807X_8 + 0.109X_9 - 0.744X_{10} + \\
 & 7.153X_{11} - 0.780X_{12} - 0.454X_{13} - 2.990X_{14} + 0.086X_{15} \\
 & - 3.521X_{16} - 3.626X_{17} + 0.404X_{18} + 4.357X_{19} + \\
 & 0.912X_{20} + 1.871X_{21} + 6.029X_{22} + 0.256X_{23} - 6.423X_{24} \\
 & - 3.641X_{25} + 1.814X_{26} + 3.472X_{27} + 0.748X_{28} + \\
 & 0.843X_{29} - 1.473X_{30} - 2.162X_{31} - 4.618X_{32} + 1.976X_{33} \\
 & + 5.702X_{34} + 2.375X_{35} + 2.252X_{36} - 73.137
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{LIB} = & 3.222X_1 + 0.698X_2 + 1.008X_3 - 2.498X_4 + 5.955X_5 - \\
 & 1.752X_6 + 0.976X_7 + 4.965X_8 + 0.095X_9 + 2.128X_{10} + \\
 & 5.874X_{11} - 0.611X_{12} + 1.333X_{13} - 3.416X_{14} - 2.885X_{15} \\
 & - 3.435X_{16} - 1.290X_{17} - 0.140X_{18} + 7.086X_{19} + \\
 & 2.085X_{20} + 2.269X_{21} + 1.490X_{22} + 1.736X_{23} - 5.163X_{24} \\
 & - 0.118X_{25} - 1.861X_{26} + 1.025X_{27} + 2.862X_{28} - \\
 & 1.898X_{29} - 0.595X_{30} - 1.904X_{31} + 1.053X_{32} - 0.682X_{33} \\
 & + 3.153X_{34} + 5.164X_{35} - 0.579X_{36} - 71.096
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{NDP} = & - 3.495X_1 - 0.160X_2 + 0.547X_3 - 2.248X_4 + 0.821X_5 \\
 & - 2.834X_6 + 7.187X_7 + 3.229X_8 + 0.386X_9 + 1.671X_{10} \\
 & + 2.243X_{11} + 0.578X_{12} + 2.224X_{13} - 3.367X_{14} - \\
 & 1.903X_{15} - 1.297X_{16} - 1.353X_{17} + 4.523X_{18} + 0.686X_{19} \\
 & + 0.788X_{20} - 1.578X_{21} + 1.090X_{22} + 2.172X_{23} -
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& 0.324X_{24} + 0.145X_{25} - 0.561X_{26} - 1.515X_{27} - 0.333X_{28} \\
& + 1.589X_{29} - 2.107X_{30} - 0.424X_{31} + 2.575X_{32} - \\
& 0.911X_{33} + 5.911X_{34} + 2.910X_{35} + 3.858X_{36} - 67.558
\end{aligned}$$

where X_1 = FORCORP
 X_2 = IMMIGRTN
 X_3 = ABORTION
 X_4 = SEPARATE
 X_5 = AUTO
 X_6 = GOVTROLE
 X_7 = FREEENTE
 X_8 = TRADITIN
 X_9 = WELFARE
 X_{10} = FEDERAL
 X_{11} = NATIONAL
 X_{12} = POLICE
 X_{13} = CENSOR
 X_{14} = FACTORY
 X_{15} = FARMERS
 X_{16} = UNDERDEV
 X_{17} = ANGLICAN
 X_{18} = CIC

where X_{19} = PROFESSO
 X_{20} = ORANGE
 X_{21} = BRITAIN
 X_{22} = JEWS
 X_{23} = NVIETNAM
 X_{24} = CORPEXEC
 X_{25} = FRCEDNS
 X_{26} = USTATES
 X_{27} = EMPIRE
 X_{28} = ACTION
 X_{29} = WOMENS
 X_{30} = UNION
 X_{31} = MONARCHY
 X_{32} = CMA
 X_{33} = POLLUTIN
 X_{34} = DEVELOPE
 X_{35} = OMA
 X_{36} = WELFRE

$$Y_{PC} = 1.593X_1 + 0.385X_2 + 0.444X_3 - 0.006X_4 + 0.037X_5 \\ + 0.014X_6$$

$$Y_{LIB} = 2.197X_1 + 0.382X_2 + 0.460X_3 + 0.018X_4 + 0.036X_5 \\ + 0.013X_6$$

$$Y_{NDF} = 1.347X_1 + 0.360X_2 + 0.377X_3 + 0.074X_4 + 0.078X_5 \\ + 0.015X_6$$

where X_1 = SAFE (relative safeness of seat on a seven point scale)

X_2 = URBAN (percentage of riding that is urban)

X_3 = FARMERS (percentage of riding that is composed of farmers)

X_4 = WORKERS (percentage of riding that is composed of industrial workers)

X_5 = CATHOLIC (percentage of riding that is populated by Roman Catholics)

X_6 = DISTANCE (number of miles that riding is from Queen's Park)

APPENDIX IX

ORDER OF ENTRY OF VARIABLES,
STEP-WISE DISCRIMINATIONDistinguishing Parties -- All Ideological Variables

VARIABLE	U-STATISTIC	VARIABLE	U-STATISTIC
1. Freeente	.3336	20. UStates	.0120
2. Auto	.1965	21. Orange	.0113
3. Separate	.1267	22. OMA	.0109
4. ForCorp	.0899	23. NVietnam	.0101
5. Federal	.0658	24. Empire	.0097
6. National	.0541	25. CorpExec	.0093
7. Professo	.0447	26. Censor	.0090
8. CMA	.0376	27. Anglican	.0086
9. CIC	.0301	28. Farmers	.0079
10. Develope	.0301	29. Immigrtn	.0077
11. Womens	.0274	30. Police	.0076
12. Action	.0248	31. Underdev	.0074
13. Union	.0229	32. Traditin	.0073
14. Welfre	.0207	33. Monarchy	.0072
15. Britain	.0188	34. Abortion	.0071
16. FrCdns	.0175	35. Factory	.0071
17. Jews	.0142	36. Welfare	.0071
18. Govtrole	.0133		
19. Pollutin	.0128	not included -	
		37. Lions	

Distinguishing Parties -- Tory Variables

1. Freeente	.3336	10. Jews	.0656
2. Auto	.1965	11. Anglican	.0627
3. Separate	.1267	12. Empire	.0591
4. National	.1057	13. UStates	.0573
5. CMA	.0938	14. Monarchy	.0563
6. Britain	.0879	15. Farmers	.0555
7. Factory	.0830	16. OMA	.0545
8. CorpExec	.0788	17. Orange	.0543
9. FrCdns	.0741	18. Traditin	.0543

Distinguishing Parties -- Socialist Variables

1. Freeente	.3336	4. National	.1100
2. Auto	.1965	5. Professo	.0939
3. ForCorp	.1380	6. CMA	.0784

VARIABLE	U-STATISTIC	VARIABLE	U-STATISTIC
7. CIC	.0658	14. FrCdns	.0428
8. Pollutin	.0598	15. Jews	.0408
9. NVietnam	.0535	16. Action	.0393
10. Govtrole	.0496	17. Womens	.0363
11. Underdev	.0475	18. Welfare	.0358
12. Union	.0461	19. Welfre	.0356
13. Immigrtn	.0443	20. Factory	.0351

Distinguishing Parties -- Whig Variables

1. Freeente	.3336	7. Censor	.1588
2. ForCorp	.2516	8. Empire	.1534
3. CMA	.1962	9. OMA	.1497
4. Develope	.1796	10. CorpExec	.1477
5. UStates	.1722	11. Orange	.1474
6. Abortion	.1669		

Distinguishing Parties -- Personal Characteristics

1. Active	.8414	7. Tenure	.4856
2. Yrserve	.7055	8. Member	.4615
3. Leaders	.5950	9. Comrole	.4411
4. Influen	.5636	10. Birth	.4282
5. Nominatn	.5274	11. Conloyal	.4121
6. Blishen	.5150	12. Yreducat	.4091

Distinguishing Parties -- Constituency Characteristics

1. Workers	.7474	4. Catholic	.5297
2. Seat	.6365	5. Distance	.5112
3. Farmers	.5659	6. Urban	.5026

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